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SUMMARY
As computer and communication networks become prevalent, the Internet has
been a battlefield for attackers and defenders. One of the most powerful weapons
for attackers is the Internet worm. Specifically, a worm attacks vulnerable computer
systems and employs self-propagating methods to flood the Internet rapidly. As a
result, worms, such as Code Red, Slammer, and Witty, have infected hundreds of
thousands of hosts and become a significant threat to network security and manage-
ment. Moreover, the attacking methods generated by worms’ designers have become
increasingly sophisticated, which poses considerable challenges to defenders.
The objective of this research is to characterize worm attack behaviors, analyze
Internet vulnerabilities, and develop effective countermeasures. More specifically,
some fundamental factors that enable a worm to be designed with advanced scanning
methods are presented and investigated through mathematical modeling, simulations,
and real measurements.
First, one factor is an uneven vulnerable-host distribution that leads to an optimal
scanning method called importance scanning. Such a new method is developed from
and named after importance sampling in statistics and enables a worm to spread much
faster than both random and routable scanning. The information of vulnerable-host
distributions, however, may not be known before a worm is released. To overcome this,
worms using two sub-optimal methods are then investigated. One is a self-learning
worm that can accurately estimate the underlying vulnerable-host distribution while
propagating. The other is a localized-scanning worm that has been exploited by Code
xv
Red II and Nimda worms. The optimal localized scanning and three variants of lo-
calized scanning are also studied. To fight against importance-scanning, self-learning,
and localized-scanning worms, defenders should scatter applications uniformly in the
entire IP-address space from the viewpoint of game theory. Next, a new metric, re-
ferred to as the non-uniformity factor, is presented to quantify both the unevenness
of a vulnerable-host distribution and the spreading ability of network-aware worms.
This metric is essentially the Renyi information entropy and better characterizes the
non-uniformity of a distribution than the Shannon entropy. With the help of the
non-uniformity factor, five data sets from real measurements show that vulnerable
hosts are indeed highly unevenly distributed in the Internet.
Finally, another fundamental factor is topology information that enables topological-
scanning worms. The spreading dynamics of topological-scanning worms are modeled





Since the Morris worm arose in 1988, Internet worms have been a persistent security
threat. For example, the Code Red worm compromised at least 359,000 machines in
24 hours on July 19, 2001 [39]. The Slammer worm was unleashed with a 376-byte
user datagram protocol (UDP) packet and infected more than 90% of vulnerable hosts
in 10 minutes on January 25, 2003 [41]. These active worms caused large parts of
the Internet to be temporarily inaccessible and cost both public and private sectors
millions of dollars. Moreover, the frequency and the virulence of active-worm out-
breaks have been increasing dramatically in the last few years, presenting a significant
threat to today’s Internet. Therefore, it is imperative to characterize the worm attack
behaviors, analyze Internet vulnerabilities, and study countermeasures accordingly.
1.1 Internet Worm Attacks
A key characteristic of an Internet worm is self-propagation. That is, active worms
can spread rapidly by infecting computer systems and by using infected hosts to
disseminate the worms in an automated fashion. Based on the target-search process,
we can divide Internet worms into two types: scan-based and topology-based worms.
1.1.1 Scan-Based Worms
A scan-based worm probes the entire IPv4 address space or the routable address
space. For example, when a worm is released into the Internet, it simultaneously
scans many hosts in an attempt to find a vulnerable host. When a target is found,
the worm sends out a probe to infect it. After this target is compromised, the worm
transfers a copy of itself to this host. The newly infected host then begins to run
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the worm program and to compromise other targets. All these steps are combined
into one for the Slammer worm [41]. That is, the Slammer worm uses a single UDP
packet to scan, compromise, and spread the worm to targets.
1.1.2 Topology-Based Worms
A topology-based worm spreads through topological neighbors. For example, the
Morris worm retrieves the neighbor list from the local Unix files /ect/hosts.equiv and
/.rhosts and in individual users’ .forward and .rhosts files. Another topological worm
is a SSH worm, which locates new targets by searching its current host for the names
and the addresses of other hosts that are likely to be susceptible to infection [55]. An
email virus is another example of topological worms. When an email user receives an
email message and opens the attachment containing a virus program, the virus infects
the user’s machine and uses the recipient’s address book to send copies of itself to
other email addresses. The addresses in the address book disclose the neighborhood
relationship.
1.2 Research Objectives and Solutions
The objective of this thesis is to model and defend against worm attacks that use
different advanced scanning methods. Specifically, we investigate the fundamental
factors that enable a worm to be designed with advanced scanning methods. We
attempt to answer the following important questions:
• What factors can help a worm spread faster and why?
• When worms take advantage of a specific factor, what is the “best-case scenario”
for worm attacks?
• How can we analyze quantitatively the relationship between the spreading speed
that worms can achieve and the factors that worms can use?
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• How can we defend against such fast-spreading worms?
To investigate these questions, we apply mathematical modeling methodology and
verify analytical results through simulations and real measurements. Mathematical
models can provide quantitative analysis on the propagation dynamics of worms and
the effectiveness of defense systems. Specifically, our mathematical models ignore the
details of the infection process inside a single computer and focus on key character-
istics of worm-spreading dynamics. For example, we consider a vulnerable host to
be in one of two possible discrete statuses, infected or susceptible. A susceptible host
can be infected by other infectious hosts, while an infected host can be recovered and
become susceptible. Combining infection and recovery provides one of the simplest
models, the susceptible → infected → susceptible (SIS) model. Here, the susceptible
→ infected (SI) model, which further ignores recovery, is regarded as a special case
of the SIS model. Although simple, the SIS (or SI) model captures the most im-
portant characteristics of worm-scanning methods. Meanwhile, simulations and real
measurements are used to verify our analytical results and approximations.
In this thesis, the following four topics are investigated:
1. Designing an optimal worm-scanning method: Most Internet worms use
random scanning. The distribution of vulnerable hosts on the Internet, how-
ever, is highly non-uniform over the IP-address space. This implies that random
scanning wastes many scans on invulnerable addresses and more virulent scan-
ning schemes may take advantage of the non-uniformity of a vulnerable-host
distribution. An optimal scanning method, importance scanning, is presented.
Importance scanning is developed from and named after importance sampling
in statistics and scans the IP-address space according to an empirical distribu-
tion of vulnerable hosts. Furthermore, a game-theory approach is applied to
counteract importance-scanning worms.
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2. Analyzing sub-optimal worm-scanning methods: The use of side infor-
mation by an attacker can help a worm speed up the propagation. This philoso-
phy has been the basis for advanced worm-scanning mechanisms such as hitlist
scanning, routable scanning, and importance scanning. Some of these scan-
ning methods use information on vulnerable hosts. Such information, however,
may not be easy to collect before a worm is released. As the optimal scanning
strategy is difficult to implement, two practical sub-optimal scanning methods
are investigated. Specifically, a self-learning worm using importance scanning
is presented. The self-learning worm is demonstrated to have the ability to
accurately estimate the underlying vulnerable-host distribution if a sufficient
number of infected hosts are observed. Another sub-optimal scanning method
is localized scanning that has been used by Code Red II and Nimda worms.
The optimal localized scanning and three variants of localized scanning are also
studied.
3. Evaluating the vulnerability of the Internet: Five data sets from real mea-
surements show the clustered vulnerable-hosts distributions consistently. The
information on the highly uneven distributions of vulnerable hosts is exploited
by network-aware worms, such as importance-scanning and localized-scanning
worms. It is not well understood, however, how to characterize the relation-
ships between vulnerable-host distributions and network-aware worms. A new
metric, referred to as the non-uniformity factor, is presented to quantify both
the unevenness of a vulnerable-host distribution and the spreading ability of
network-aware worms. This metric is essentially the Renyi information entropy
and better characterizes the non-uniformity of a distribution than the Shannon
entropy.
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4. Modeling the spread of topological-scanning worms: It is important
that defenders understand how topological worms spread quantitatively. The
spread of topological-scanning worms, however, is especially hard to model. The
difficulty lies in characterizing the impact of topologies and the interactions
among nodes in both space and time. A spatial-temporal model for worm
propagation in networks is proposed. As the spatial dependence is particularly
difficult to characterize, we propose the independent model and the Markov
model as simple approximations. Our models are motivated by probabilistic
graphs, which have been widely investigated in machine learning.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 surveys the related work.
Chapter 3 presents an optimal worm-scanning method using vulnerable-host distribu-
tions and the corresponding countermeasure from the viewpoint of game theory. Since
the optimal worm-scanning method is difficult to implement, Chapter 4 and 5 focus
on worms exploiting two sub-optimal scanning methods: a self-learning worm and a
localized-scanning worm. Chapter 6 further studies a new metric, the non-uniformity
factor, to quantify the unevenness of a vulnerable-host distribution and the spreading
ability of network-aware worms. Next, Chapter 7 models topological-scanning worm
propagation in network, using a spatial-temporal random process. Finally, Chapter





In this thesis, we focus on two types of worms: scan-based and topology-based worms.
A scan-based worm probes the entire IPv4 address space or the routable address space,
while a topology-based worm spreads through topological neighbors. These two types
of worms are the most important worms and have been widely studied.
2.1 Scan-Based Worms
A scan-based worm spreads by employing distinct scanning mechanisms such as ran-
dom, selective random, and localized scanning [59, 70]. Random scanning selects
target IPv4 addresses at random and is used by such famous worms as Code Red and
Slammer. Selective random scanning reduces the scanning space, using the informa-
tion such as the Bogon list [62] and/or the IANA’s IPv4 address allocation map [87],
and is used by the Slapper worm. Localized scanning preferentially scans for hosts in
the “local” address space and is used by Code Red II and Nimda worms.
Some advanced scanning methods have been developed in the research community.
For example, Weaver presented the hitlist-scanning idea [68] to speed up the spread
of worms at the initial stage. There, a list of vulnerable machines is built beforehand
and targeted first when the worm is released. An extreme case for the hitlist-scanning
worms is called flash worms [60], where IP addresses of all vulnerable machines are
known in advance and gathered into the list. The flash worms are considered the
fastest possible worms, as every worm scan can hit a vulnerable host. One other
scanning method to improve the spread of worms is to use the information provided
by BGP routing tables. This scanning method is called routable scanning [70, 79]
and is a special case of selective random scanning. Zou et al. designed two types of
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routable-scanning worms (also called routing worms) [79]. One is based on class-A
(x.0.0.0/8) address allocations and is thus called a “Class-A routing worm.” Such a
worm can reduce the scanning space to 45.3% of the entire IPv4 address space. The
other is based on BGP routing tables and is thus called a “BGP routing worm.”
Such a worm can reduce the scanning space to only about 28.6% of the entire IPv4
address space. One other strategy that a worm can potentially employ is DNS random
scanning [26], where a worm uses the DNS infrastructure to locate likely targets by
guessing DNS names instead of IP addresses. Such a worm in an IPv6 Internet is
shown to exhibit a propagation speed comparable to that of an IPv4 random-scanning
worm.
Most of these advanced worms can propagate far faster than a traditional random-
scanning worm. When these advanced worms are studied, however, vulnerable hosts
are assumed to be uniformly distributed in either the entire IPv4 address or the scan-
ning space. Hence, the information on a vulnerable-host distribution is not exploited
by the worms.
Moreover, these advanced scanning mechanisms have been developed based on the
philosophy: The use of side information by an attacker can help a worm speed up the
propagation. In the Internet, however, it may not be easy for attackers to collect the
information on vulnerable hosts. For example, Windows SQL database servers do not
advertise their addresses [41, 79]. Therefore, it is difficult for the Slammer worm to
obtain the list of vulnerable hosts or the underlying distribution of vulnerable hosts
before the worm is released.
Only a handful of works have been carried out on localized scanning. Chen et al.
pointed out that if the vulnerable hosts are uniformly distributed in the IPv4 address
space, localized scanning spreads at a slightly slower rate than random scanning [8].
Zou et al. showed that if the vulnerable hosts are uniformly distributed only in the
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routable address space, localized scanning has a spreading speed comparable to Class-
A routable scanning [81]. Rajab et al. further demonstrated that if the vulnerable
hosts follow a power law distribution, localized scanning can propagate much faster
than random scanning [49]. The prior work, however, focuses on simulation compar-
isons between localized scanning and random scanning. The mathematical reasoning
on these comparisons has not been studied.
2.2 Topology-Based Worms
Topology-based worms (or topological-scanning worms) rely on the “address” infor-
mation contained in the victim machines to locate new targets and is used by the
Morris worm.
Several approaches have been proposed to model and simulate worm spreading in
different topologies. Kephart and White presented the Epidemiological model, which
is suitable for analyzing virus spreading in random graphs [32]. This work points out
the difficulty in applying the Epidemiological model to study arbitrary topologies.
Garetto et al. analyzed worm spreading in small-world topologies using a variation
of the influence model, where the influence of neighbors is constrained to take a mul-
tilinear form [28]. Boguñá et al. studied epidemic spreading in complex networks [6],
and Wang et al. proposed a model for virus propagation in arbitrary topologies [67].
Both works [6, 67] are proposed to obtain the epidemic threshold of virus infection.
Zou et al. and Wang et al. investigated the effect of topologies and immunization
on the propagation of computer viruses through simulation [80, 66]. Ganesh et al.
modeled the spread of an epidemic as a contact process [36] to study what makes an
epidemic either weak or potent [27]. The model assumes that a vulnerable node can
be infected by its infectious neighbors at a rate that is proportional to the number
of infected neighbors. Some recent investigations focus on random-scanning worms.
Zou et al. modeled the spread of the Code Red worm, taking into consideration of the
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human countermeasures and the worm’s impact on the Internet infrastructure [78].
Chen et al. studied the propagation of active worms employing random scanning
and extended the proposed modeling method to investigate the spread of localized-
scanning worms [8]. Moore et al. applied the Epidemiological model to investigate the
requirements for containing the self-propagation worm with random target selection
[40]. The prior work, however, has not incorporated the spatial dependence on worm
propagation in networks. This motivates the development of mathematical models
to capture the spatial dependence and the use of spatial models to characterize both
the transient and equilibrium behaviors of worm propagation with different scanning
methods in arbitrary topologies. Furthermore, based on the models proposed in this
thesis we studied the significance of the spatial dependence in determining epidemic





As the number of computers and communication networks increases, Internet worms
have become increasingly prevalent [39, 41, 56]. Using malicious, self-propagating
codes, worms spread rapidly by infecting computer systems and disseminating them-
selves in an automated fashion using the infected hosts.
Most worms employ random scanning to select target IP addresses. Since the
density of vulnerable hosts is low, a random scan hits a vulnerable machine with a
small probability. For example, the Code Red worm infected a vulnerable population
of 360,000 machines among 232 IP addresses [77]. Thus, the probability that a random
scan will hit a vulnerable target is only 360,000
232
= 8.38 × 10−5. Therefore, random
scanning wastes many scans on invulnerable addresses.
Future worms, however, are likely to employ more effective scanning strategies
to identify their targets. Hence, it is important that advanced scanning strategies
that can potentially be used to access worst-case scenarios be studied. This chapter
proposes such an optimal scanning method referred to as importance scanning. Im-
portance scanning is inspired by importance sampling in statistics [72, 31, 57]. The
basic idea of importance sampling is to make rare events occur more frequently and
thus reduce the number of samples needed for accurately estimating the correspond-
ing probability. Rare events for worm scanning correspond to hitting a target in a
large population. Thus, importance scanning allows attackers to focus on the most
relevant parts of an address space so that the probability of hitting vulnerable hosts
increases.
Importance scanning relies on a certain statistic of an underlying vulnerable-host
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distribution. An attacker can potentially obtain such information by querying a
database of parties to the vulnerable protocol, stealthy scanning the (partial) target
address space, and/or searching the records of old worms [59].
In view of the amount of information an attacker can obtain, random, flash [60],
and routing [79] worms can be regarded as special cases of importance-scanning
worms. In particular, a random worm has no information about the vulnerable-
host distribution and thus regards the distribution as uniform in the IPv4 space. A
flash worm acquires all knowledge, and the target distribution is uniform only in the
vulnerable-population space. A routing worm has the knowledge from BGP routing
tables about the space of existing hosts, and the corresponding distribution can be
considered as uniform in the routing space.
In this chapter, we assume that a probability distribution of vulnerable hosts is
available/obtainable. We then intend to answer the following questions:
• How can an attacker design a fast importance-scanning worm by taking advan-
tage of the knowledge of the vulnerable-host distribution?
• How can we quantitatively analyze the relationship between the speed that
worms can achieve and the knowledge that attackers can obtain?
• How can a defender counteract such importance-scanning worms?
To answer these questions, we focus on two quantities: the infection rate that char-
acterizes how fast worms can spread at an early stage and the scanning strategy that
is used to locate vulnerable hosts. We first derive relationships between the infec-
tion rate and scanning strategies. We then model the spread of importance-scanning
worms, using the analytical active worm propagation (AAWP) model [8]. We derive
the optimal scanning strategy that maximizes the infection rate. That is, the opti-
mal strategy corresponds to the best-case scenario for attackers and the worst-case
scenario for defenders. As the optimal strategy is difficult to achieve in reality, we
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derive a sub-optimal scanning strategy as an approximation. To assess the virulence,
we compare importance scanning with random and routable scanning. We take the
empirical distributions of Witty-worm victims and Web servers as examples of the
vulnerable-host distribution. We show that an importance-scanning worm based on
parameters chosen from real measurements can spread nearly twice as fast as a routing
worm before the victim population becomes saturated.
Moreover, we demonstrate, from the viewpoint of game theory, that a defense
mechanism against importance-scanning worms requires the uniform distribution of
an application. Under this defense strategy, the best strategy of importance scanning
is equivalent to the random-scanning strategy.
Our designed importance scanning is inspired by importance sampling [72, 31, 57].
Our work, however, is different from [72] in that [72] is on estimating the density of
Web servers and we focus on optimal scanning worms that use an uneven vulnerable-
host distribution. Hence, while [72] studies a static quantity as the density of Web
servers, we consider a dynamic process as the worm propagation. Moreover, [72] uses
the variance of an estimator as the performance indicator, and we employ the worm
propagation speed, such as the infection rate, as the objective function.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides the
background on vulnerable-host distributions and a random worm propagation model.
Section 3.3 describes the problem. Section 3.4 characterizes the importance-scanning
strategy through the theoretical analysis. Section 3.5 shows the propagation speed
of importance-scanning worms empirically. Section 3.6 further discusses the defense




The distribution of vulnerable hosts in the Internet is not uniform. This is evident as
no hosts can exist in reserved or multicast IPv4 address ranges assigned by the Internet
Assigned Number Authority (IANA) [87, 73]. More importantly, the vulnerable-host
distribution may be highly non-uniform over the registered IPv4 address space as
indicated by our two collected traces.
The first trace is a traffic log of the Witty worm obtained from CAIDA [92].
The Witty worm attacks ISS firewall products and carries a destructive payload [56].
CAIDA used a Network Telescope to record the packets from the victims of the Witty
worm. Since the network telescope approximately contains 224 addresses, the collected
trace can accurately reflect the distribution of hosts that are vulnerable to the Witty
worm [56]. The collected victim addresses are then used to form a group distribution
in /8 subnets, where
pg(i) =
number of addresses with the first byte equal to i
total number of collected addresses
, (1)
where i = 0, 1, · · · , 255. The results are shown in Figure 1(a). It is observed that
the distribution of vulnerable hosts is far from uniform. We further plot the comple-
mentary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of the distribution of Witty-worm
victims in /16 subnets in log-log scales in Figure 1(b) for collected data. The CCDF,
denoted by F (d), is defined as the fraction of the /16 subnets with the number of
vulnerable hosts greater than d. We find that a lognormal distribution with mean 1.2
and standard deviation 1.55 closely fits these measurement data. This indicates that
the distribution of Witty-worm victims nearly follows a power law distribution.
The second trace is the Web-server (port 80) distribution. To estimate the dis-
tribution of Web servers, we exploited a random uniform resource locator (URL)
13

















































(b) Vulnerable-host distribution (/16 subnets) in
log-log scales and lognormal curve fitting.
Figure 1: Uneven distribution of hosts vulnerable to the Witty worm.














































(b) Web-server distribution (/16 subnets) in log-
log scales and lognormal curve fitting.
Figure 2: Uneven distribution of Web servers.
generator from UROULETTE (http://www.uroulette.com/) to collect 13,866 IP ad-
dresses of Web servers on January 24, 2005. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show the group
distribution in /8 subnets and the CCDF in /16 subnets for Web servers. The log-
normal distribution has mean 0.15 and standard deviation 1.25, and closely fits the
measurement data.
To summarize, the distributions on Web servers and Witty-worm victims are
both non-uniform. These two distributions can both be approximated by lognormal
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distributions but with different means and variances. In particular, the distribution
of Witty-worm victims has a larger mean and a larger standard deviation than that
of Web servers. This means that the Witty-worm victim distribution is more non-
uniform than the Web-server distribution.
3.2.2 Random Worm Propagation Model
We now review a worm propagation model as preparation for relating the rate of
worm spreading with the distribution of vulnerable hosts. A simple model, known as
the susceptible → infected (SI) model, has been used to model the spread of random-
scanning worms in various earlier works [59, 79, 26]. The model assumes that each
host has only two states: susceptible or infected. Once infected, a host remains
infected.
As importance scanning (sampling) is usually performed in discrete time [72], we
adopt a discrete-time SI model. In particular, we use the analytical active worm
propagation (AAWP) model, developed by Chen et al. in [8]. In the AAWP model,
the spread of random-scanning worms is characterized as follows:
It+1 = It + (N − It)[1− (1− 1
Ω
)sIt ], (2)
where It is the number of infected hosts at time t (t ≥ 0); N is the number of
vulnerable hosts; s is the scanning rate of the worm; and Ω is the scanning space. At
t = 0, I0 represents the number of hosts on the hitlist.
When a worm begins to spread, It << N and sIt << Ω. The AAWP model can
be approximated by
It+1 ≈ It + N · sIt
Ω
= (1 + α)It, (3)
where α = sN
Ω
is the infection rate [79]. The infection rate represents the average
number of vulnerable hosts that can be infected per unit time by one infected host
during the early stage of worm propagation. Based on Equation (3), It ≈ (1 + α)tI0,
i.e., the number of infected hosts increases exponentially. Therefore, to speed up
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the spread of worms at the early stage, attackers should design effective scanning
methods to increase the infection rate. For instance, a traditional random worm
scans the entire IPv4 address space, and thus Ω = 232. The infection rate of this
worm is α0 =
sN
232
. In contrast, a BGP and a Class-A routing worm can achieve faster
infection rates with the same scanning rate and the same number of targets [79]:
α1 =
sN




We now describe the problems studied in this chapter. Let s be the scanning rate or
the number of scans that an infected host sends per unit time. Define An (1 ≤ n ≤ s)
as an IPv4 address probed by the nth scan from an infected host at the early stage
of worm propagation. Thus, An is a random variable, and An ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 232}. Let











I(An) = N . Let p(An) denote the actual vulnerable-host distribution,










, if I(An) = 1;
0, if I(An) = 0.
(5)




Let p∗(An) denote the probability that the worm scans address An. Note that
∑
An
p∗(An) = 1. p∗(An) can be a uniform distribution as in random-scanning worms
or a non-uniform biasing distribution as in flash worms. p∗(An) is chosen by an at-
tacker. The choice of the scanning distribution p∗(An) is essential to the effectiveness
of importance scanning. As we shall see, p∗(An) depends on the actual probability
distribution p(An).
In this chapter, we intend to answer the following questions:
16
• Given complete knowledge about p(An), what is the optimal choice of p∗(An)
that maximizes infection rate α?
• Given partial knowledge about p(An), what is the optimal choice of p∗(An) that
maximizes α?
• What are the spread dynamics of importance-scanning worms using the optimal
or the practical choice of p∗(An)?
• How much faster can an importance-scanning worm spread than a random or a
routing worm?
• How can we defend against such importance-scanning worms by customizing
p(An)?
Table 1 shows the notations used in this thesis.
3.4 Importance Scanning
We begin by answering the first three of these five questions in this section. This
suffices to deriving the infection rate of importance-scanning worms and modeling
the spread of importance-scanning worms.
3.4.1 Infection Rate
Let R be the number of hosts that can be infected per unit time by one infected host





where we assume that different scans do not hit the same target at the early stage of
worm propagation, i.e., if i 6= j, then Ai 6= Aj. Therefore, the infection rate is given
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Table 1: Notations used in this thesis.
Notation Explanation
s Scanning rate: Number of scans that an infected host sends per unit time
N Total number of vulnerable hosts
Ω Scanning space: address space that a worm scans
p(An) Actual vulnerable-host distribution: Probability of address An being
vulnerable to a worm
p∗(An) Scanning distribution: Probability of a worm scan hitting address An
R Number of vulnerable hosts that can be infected per unit time by one
infected host during the early stage of worm propagation
α Infection rate: α = E[R]
It Expected number of infected host at time t
m Number of groups in the Internet
Ni Number of vulnerable hosts in group i
Ωi Size of the address space in group i
Di Set of addresses in network i
It,i Expected number of infected hosts in group i at time t
pg(i) Group distribution: Percentage of vulnerable hosts in group i
p∗g(i) Group scanning distribution: Probability of a worm scan hitting group i
pi(b) Interface distribution: Probability of finding a vulnerable host with the
interface equal to b, given that the host is in network i
p∗i (b) Interface scanning distribution: Probability of scanning interface b,
given that a scan hits network i

























where E∗[·] denotes the expectation with respect to the scanning distribution p∗(An).






p∗(An) = s, (12)
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for any p∗(An).
Hence, the infection rate is strongly influenced by the choice of scanning distribu-
tion p∗(An). A choice of p∗(An) determines a scanning strategy, and a good choice,
in the view of an attacker, should maximize infection rate α. Two special cases have
been observed on “choosing” p∗(An). The first case is the random-scanning worms,
in which p∗(An) = 1232 . Thus, α =
sN
232
= α0. The second case is the flash worms, in
which p∗(An) = p(An). In this case, p∗(An) obtains the optimal scanning strategy
p∗opt(An), which leads to maxp∗(An){α} = s, indicating that every scan from the worm
would hit a vulnerable host.
One interpretation of p∗opt(An) suggests that a good worm scanning strategy should
concentrate the scans on the areas that are more likely to find a vulnerable host. The
vulnerable-host probability distribution p(An), however, cannot be obtained with-
out probing the entire IP address space or gathering a complete database of parties
to the vulnerable protocol. Therefore, attackers may not acquire the entire knowl-
edge of p(An). However, partial knowledge can be obtained, e.g., by aggregating the
subspaces of IP addresses.
3.4.2 Group Distributions
Such partial information is referred to as group distributions, which capture the statis-
tics of groups of addresses rather than individual addresses. The vulnerable-host
probability distribution in groups is essentially the marginal of the actual distribu-
tion p(An). Such groups of addresses can be formed in several ways. For example,
IP addresses can be grouped by using the conventional 4-byte description. In [72],
this approach is applied to measure the size of the Internet via importance sampling.
Here, we extract relevant groups in a more general setting by defining the networks.
In particular, we regard a network as a group of IP addresses that can be identified
by such diverse methods as either the first byte of IP addresses (/8 subnets) or IP
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prefixes in classless inter-domain routing (CIDR).
We assume that the Internet is partitioned into m networks. Let Di (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m)
denote the partition set of addresses in network i, which has Ωi (Ωi ≥ 0) addresses.
Thus,
∑m
i=1 Ωi = Ω = 2
32. We define the group distribution pg(i) (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m) as








where Ni is the population of vulnerable hosts in network i.
The partition of networks reflects the knowledge that attackers can obtain. For
example, in one extreme case of random-scanning worms, m = 1 and Ω1 = 2
32. In the
other extreme case of flash worms, m = 232 and Ωi = 1 (i = 1, 2, · · · , 232). Another
choice of partitioning networks is based on the first byte of IP addresses (/8 subnets),
where m = 28 and Ωi = 2
24 (i = 1, 2, · · · , 28). The amount of knowledge collected by
the worm with the /8 subnet distribution is only partial, somewhere between that by
the random worm and that by the flash worm.
Recall that the goal of importance scanning is to maximize the infection rate.








Refer to the location of an address An that is in network i as the interface denoted
by b (b = 0, 1, · · · , Ωi − 1). Let pi(b) denote the actual probability of finding a




. Similarly, define group scanning distribution p∗g(i) as the probability
of scanning network i and interface scanning distribution p∗i (b) as the probability of
scanning interface b, given that a scan hits network i for the scanning distribution
p∗(An). We can obtain
p(An) = pg(i) · pi(b) (15)
p∗(An) = p∗g(i) · p∗i (b), (16)
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We assume that attackers can obtain information only about group distribution pg(i)
and cannot acquire further knowledge about interface distribution pi(b). Therefore,
if a scan hits network i, the Ωi hosts in this network are targeted by that scan with
the same likelihood, i.e., p∗i (b) =
1
Ωi









Equation (19) provides the relationships among the infection rate, the group dis-
tribution, and the group scanning distribution. Let vi =
pg(i)
Ωi
, referred to as the





















1, j = arg maxk {vk};
0, otherwise.
(23)
This means that the optimal importance scanning of a worm is to scan only the
network with the largest vulnerable-host density.
3.4.3 Importance-Scanning Worm Propagation Model
We now model the spreading dynamics of importance-scanning worms based on the
information of a group distribution.
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At time t (t ≥ 0), let It,i denote the average number of infected hosts in network
i. Thus, the total number of infected hosts It =
∑m
i=1 It,i. The rate at which network
i is scanned is sItp
∗
g(i). As an importance scanning worm employs random scanning
within each network, on the next time epoch, the number of infected hosts in network
i can be derived by the AAWP model, i.e.,





where i = 1, 2, · · · ,m and t ≥ 0. I0,i is the number of initially infected hosts in
network i. The above equation yields








<< 1, we ignore item O( 1
Ωi
2 ). Summing over i = 1, 2, · · · ,m on both sides,
we obtain

























1, j = arg maxk {Nk−It,kΩk };
0, otherwise.
(29)
When t = 0, Ni >> It,i and then maxk {Nk−It,kΩk } ≈ N maxk {vk}, which leads to
α = sN maxk {vk}. The above derivation results in an optimal importance-scanning
strategy that maximizes the infection rate.
Optimal importance scanning:
1. At each time step t, the worm first finds the network that has the largest value
of the left vulnerable-host density, i.e., j = arg maxk {Nk−It,kΩk }.
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2. Then all infected hosts concentrate on scanning this network. That is, p∗g(j) = 1
and p∗g(i) = 0, ∀i 6= j.
This optimal importance scanning strategy, however, is difficult to implement.
First, N may not be known in advance. Second, the network that has the largest
value of the left vulnerable-host density changes with time, and therefore, the opti-
mal assignment of p∗g(i) is time-varying. Even when N were given, it would require
that each infected host knows It,i, which leads to numerous information exchanges
between infected hosts. However, the essence of optimal importance scanning is that
it provides the best scenario of worm scanning using the vulnerable-host distribution,
which can be used as the baseline for a sub-optimal selection of p∗g(i).
A simple strategy for sub-optimal importance scanning is to assume p∗g(i) =
pg(i)/ΩiPm
j=1 pg(j)/Ωj
. That is, the probability that a worm scans network i is proportional
to the vulnerable-host density of this network. If Ω1 = Ω2 = · · · = Ωm, then
p∗g(i) = pg(i). For this scanning strategy, Equation (24) becomes
It+1,i = It,i + (Ni − It,i)[1− (1− 1Ωi )
sIt
pg(i)/ΩiPm
j=1 pg(j)/Ωj ]. (30)
Sub-optimal importance scanning:
1. Before a worm is released, an attacker first obtains vulnerable-host group distri-





in the worm code.
2. At each time step t, the worm scans network i with probability p∗g(i).
3.5 Experiments
In this section, we study the propagation speed of importance-scanning worms based
on parameters chosen from the real measurements. We first introduce the experimen-
tal set-up. We then show the effect of knowledge and vulnerable-host distributions
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on the propagation of importance-scanning worms. Finally, we compare importance
scanning with random and routable scanning.
3.5.1 Experimental Set-up
In our experiments, we use the model in Equation (2) to imitate the spread of random-
scanning and routing worms. Meanwhile, we employ the model in Equations (24) and
(29) to study propagation as a result of the optimal importance-scanning strategy. We
also use the model in Equation (30) to simulate the spread of sub-optimal importance-
scanning worms. To implement the models in Equations (24), (29), and (30), we need
to obtain group distribution pg(i). Here, we use the Witty-worm victim and the Web-
server distributions as examples of the vulnerable-host distribution. In other words,
we assume that worms attack vulnerable hosts with the same group distribution as
that of Witty-worm victims or Web servers. Our collected trace of Web servers does
not include all Web servers. However, we assume that the estimated results obtained
by Equation (1) are the actual group distribution of Web servers.
The parameters we use in simulated worms are comparable to those in Witty
and Code Red worms for evaluating propagation. The Witty worm has a vulnerable
population N = 12, 000 and a scanning rate s = 1, 200 per second [56, 81]. The Code
Red worm has parameters N = 360, 000 and s = 358 per minute [77]. The victims of
the Code Red worm is assumed to have the same group distribution as Web servers.
We then refer to such an importance-scanning worm as the importance-scanning (IS)
Witty or Code Red. Since the experimental results of the Code Red worm are similar
to those of the Witty worm, we mainly present the observations from the Witty worm.
3.5.2 Knowledge Effect
The amount of knowledge about a vulnerable-host distribution affects the rate of
spread of importance-scanning worms. Figure 3 shows the propagation compari-
son among sub-optimal importance-scanning Witty worms with different amounts
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 Suboptimal IS Witty with /0 subnet distribution
 Suboptimal IS Witty with /8 subnet distribution
 Suboptimal IS Witty with /16 subnet distribution
Figure 3: Effect of knowledge.
of knowledge about the vulnerable-host distribution, assuming a hitlist of 10 (i.e.,
I0 = 10). If a worm has the /0 subnet distribution, it knows nothing about the distri-
bution and thus has to use random scanning. We assume that all three Witty worms
have the same scanning rate, although a worm that contains more information about
the group distribution might slow down for a larger payload. It takes the Witty worm
with a /0 subnet distribution 46.3 minutes to infect 90% of vulnerable hosts, whereas
the Witty worms with a /8 subnet distribution and a /16 subnet distribution take
only 6.6 minutes and 1.6 minutes, respectively. Therefore, more information about
the vulnerable-host distribution may help an attacker design a faster worm.
3.5.3 Vulnerable-Host Distribution Effect
A vulnerable-host distribution also affects the rate of propagation of importance-
scanning worms. Figure 4 demonstrates the spread of the sub-optimal importance-
scanning Witty worms using the /8 subnet distribution, in which vulnerable hosts
follow different distributions, assuming a hitlist of 10 (i.e., I0 = 10). A uniform
distribution in IPv4 can slow down the worm at least six times than the Witty-worm
victim distribution before the victim population becomes saturated. Therefore, the
distribution of vulnerable hosts strongly affects the rate of spread of importance-
scanning worms.
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 Uniform distribution in IPv4
 Uniform distribution in routable space
 Witty−worm victim distribution
Figure 4: Effect of distributions.
3.5.4 Propagation Comparisons
Importance scanning also helps hasten the propagation of a worm. Figure 5(a) shows
how propagation as a result of importance-scanning Witty worms compares with that
of random and BGP routing Witty worms, assuming a hitlist of 10 (i.e., I0 = 10).
The rate of spread of importance-scanning Witty worms increases significantly by
using the information on the /8 subnet distribution of vulnerable hosts. The op-
timal importance-scanning Witty worm can infect 90% vulnerable hosts in as few
as 4.2 minutes, whereas the BGP routing Witty worm requires 13.3 minutes. The
sub-optimal importance-scanning Witty worm spreads more slowly than the optimal
worm, but only takes 6.6 minutes to infect the same number of hosts. A BGP routing
worm obtains the refined information about the routable space than the worm using
the /8 subnet distribution. The BGP routing worm, however, employs random scan-
ning in the BGP routable space. Hence, such a worm, most of time, spreads more
slowly than the importance-scanning worms with the /8 subnet distribution, which
exploits the underlying uneven distribution of vulnerable hosts.
Once most of the vulnerable hosts are infected, the spread of the sub-optimal
importance-scanning Witty worm slows down. This is because the sub-optimal strat-
egy always uses the same group scanning distribution. As the infected hosts become
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(b) Witty worm with a hitlist of 1,000
Figure 5: Witty worm propagation comparisons.
saturated, a network that initially has more vulnerable hosts actually contains fewer
uninfected vulnerable machines. To overcome this problem, sub-optimal importance
scanning can choose to switch to the routable scanning when only a few uninfected
vulnerable hosts are left. Figure 5(b) shows the results for the same experiments,
assuming a hitlist of 1,000. Sub-optimal importance scanning switches to Class-A
routable scanning when 90% vulnerable hosts are infected. Compared with the prop-
agation of a BGP routing worm, importance-scanning worms spread faster before the
victim population becomes saturated.
Figure 6 shows the propagation comparison among an optimal importance-scanning
Code Red worm, a sub-optimal importance-scanning Code Red worm, a Class-A
routing Code Red worm, and a random Code Red worm, assuming I0 = 10. The
importance-scanning Code Red worms use the /8 subnet distribution. The sub-
optimal importance-scanning Code Red worm can propagate nearly twice as fast as
the Class-A routing Code Red worm before the victim population becomes saturated.
With regard to the storage requirement for /8 subnet group-distribution infor-
mation, each pg(i) requires 4 bytes, and each /8 prefix 1 byte. Therefore, the total
number of bytes is 5 × 256 = 1280. We can reduce this payload by removing the
entries with pg(i) = 0, where i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 255}. Since there are only 97 entries with
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Figure 6: Code Red worm propagation comparisons.
non-zero pg(i)’s according to the empirical distribution in Figure 1(a), the table can
be stored in a 97 × 5 = 485 byte payload. Hence, the scanning rate of importance-
scanning worms will not decrease much.
3.6 Game Theory for Attackers and Defenders
Defense against such importance-scanning worms can be modeled by relating it to
the interaction between attackers and defenders in game theory. Assume that when
an application is introduced to the Internet, defenders can choose how to deploy this
application in networks. That is, group distribution pg(i) can be controlled by defend-
ers, thus leading to a game between attackers and defenders. The attackers attempt
to maximize the infection speed (characterized by infection rate α in Equation (19))
by choosing optimal group scanning distribution p∗g(i), while the defenders endeavor
to minimize the worm propagation speed by customizing group distribution pg(i). Let




g(i) = 1} stand for the set of group scanning probability vectors p∗g.
Let U = {pg :
∑m
i=1 pg(i) = 1} represent the set of feasible probability assignments
for the application distribution. An attacker fears that if a defender knows about the
worm-scanning strategy, the defender would then choose a strategy that minpg∈U{α}.
Therefore, the objective of an attacker is to choose group scanning distribution p∗g(i)
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This is a classical two-person zero-sum game, and the following well-known theorem
[45] gives an optimal solution.

























where αopt is the value of the game.
The solution of this minmax problem is derived in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 The value of the worm-scanning game is αopt =
sN
232
, and the best strategy
for a defender is to distribute the application uniformly in the Internet, i.e., pg(i) =
Ωi
232
, where i = 1, 2, · · · ,m.
Proof: From Equation (22), we have
max
p∗g∈V





Set J = maxk {pg(k)Ωk }. The optimal choice of pg(i)′s requires that J be minimized.
Since pg(i)
Ωi







JΩi = JΩ, (36)
which leads to J ≥ 1
Ω
. The inequality holds when pg(i)
Ωi








, where i = 1, 2, · · · ,m, i.e., the defenders should deploy the









From Theorem 2, we note that when the defender uses the optimal strategy, the
best strategy that the attacker exploits is equivalent to the random-scanning strategy.
Meanwhile, Figure 4 demonstrates that the vulnerable-host distribution has a strong
effect on worm propagation. Therefore, the design of the future Internet should
consider how to distribute an application in security engineering.
In the current Internet, however, the application distributor may not control how
to deploy the application in the entire IPv4 address space. Although not applicable
for the entire Internet, the best strategy of defenders can still apply for enterprise
networks. That is, if an enterprise network attempts to defend against importance-
scanning worms, the administrator of this network should distribute the application
uniformly in the entire enterprise network from the viewpoint of game theory.
3.7 Summary
In order to effectively defend against Internet worms, we must study potential scan-
ning techniques that attackers may employ. In this chapter, we present an opti-
mal worm-scanning method, called importance scanning, using the information of a
vulnerable-host distribution. This scanning strategy then provide a best-case scenario
for attackers when the vulnerable-host distribution is available. Importance scanning
can be combined with other scanning methods such as hitlist scanning. Moreover, the
division of groups can be very general, such as domain name system (DNS) top-level
domains, countries, Autonomous Systems, IP prefixes in CIDR, the first byte of IP
addresses (/8 subnets), or the first two bytes of IP addresses (/16 subnets). For ex-
ample, when naming distribution information is exploited, importance scanning can
also be applied to DNS worms [26], which is worth further investigation. In addition,
when IPv4 is updated to IPv6, an importance-scanning worm will not be slowed down
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very much if vulnerable hosts are still distributed in a clustered fashion. A game-
theoretical approach suggests that the best strategy for defenders is to distribute the
applications evenly in the entire address space or in each enterprise network.
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CHAPTER IV
SUB-OPTIMAL WORM-SCANNING METHOD: A
SELF-LEARNING WORM
4.1 Introduction
Some advanced scanning mechanisms, such as hitlist scanning, routable scanning, and
importance scanning, have been developed based on the philosophy: The use of side
information by an attacker can help a worm speed up the propagation. In the Internet,
however, it may not be easy for attackers to collect information on vulnerable hosts.
For example, Windows SQL database servers do not advertise their addresses [41, 79].
It is therefore difficult that the Slammer worm obtain a list of vulnerable hosts or
an underlying vulnerable-host distribution before the worm is released. Nevertheless,
future worms can become more intelligent and potentially learn a certain knowledge
about, e.g. the vulnerable-host distribution, while propagating. For example, attack-
ers can estimate the distribution using measurements1. In this work, we study worm
behaviors that utilize information on the vulnerable-host distribution. In particular,
we focus on self-learning worms and intend to answer the following questions:
• How can a worm self-learn about a vulnerable-host distribution from measure-
ments and make use of such information?
• What is the performance of a self-learning worm?
Here the performance refers to the propagation speed of worms. If a worm spreads
faster, it has a better performance and is thus more virulent.
When a group vulnerable-host distribution is available, the optimal way for worms
to scan is to perform importance sampling, resulting in importance-scanning worms
1Yes, attackers can use measurement-based approaches in a similar way to networking researchers.
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as studied initially in the previous chapter and our prior work [10, 17]. When the
knowledge of the vulnerable-host group distribution is unavailable before spreading,
we design a self-learning worm. Such a worm begins with random scanning or routable
scanning and collects information on the IP addresses of infected hosts while prop-
agating. The key capability of this worm is to learn an underlying vulnerable-host
group distribution. The resulting worm spreading then consists of two stages: a learn-
ing stage where worms (attackers) obtain an empirical vulnerable-host distribution
from measurements and a sampling stage where worms scan vulnerable hosts using
the group distribution. The virulence of such a worm can be characterized through a
dynamic worm-propagation model.
We show analytically and empirically that the self-learning worm can accurately
estimate the group distribution in /8 subnets through a simple and unbiased propor-
tion estimator using as few as 500 samples (IP addresses of infected hosts). After
estimating the vulnerable-host distribution, this self-learning worm switches to im-
portance scanning. The optimal importance-scanning method has been proposed in
our prior work [10]. This optimal approach, however, is difficult to implement, since
it requires numerous information exchanges between infected hosts. Therefore, we
derive a practical importance-scanning strategy that optimizes a new metric on the
effectiveness of scanning. This metric reflects the average number of worm scans re-
quired until the first scan hits a randomly chosen vulnerable host. We demonstrate
the optimality of such importance scanning through analysis and simulation.
To evaluate the performance of our proposed self-learning worms, we use two data
sets, the distributions of Web servers and Witty-worm victims, as the examples of the
vulnerable-host distribution. We show that a self-learning worm based on parameters
chosen from the real measurements of the Code Red v2 worm spreads nearly five times
faster than a random-scanning worm, four times faster than a permutation-scanning
worm, and two times faster than a Class-A routing worm, after collecting 500 samples
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and estimating the group distribution in /8 subnets.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we give a
problem description. In Section 4.3, we characterize the optimal static importance-
scanning strategy through theoretical analysis. We then design a self-learning worm
in detail in Section 4.4 and show the performance of such a self-learning worm in
Section 4.5.We further discuss some guidelines for detecting and defending against
such self-learning worms in Section 4.6. We conclude this chapter in Section 4.7 with
a brief summary.
4.2 Problem Description
Assume that the Internet is composed of m groups. Let Ni and Ωi denote the num-
ber of vulnerable hosts and the size of the address space in group i (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m),
respectively. Thus,
∑m
i=1 Ni = N and
∑m
i=1 Ωi = Ω. Define the group distribution
of vulnerable hosts, pg(i) (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m), as the ratio between the number of vul-




Define the group scanning distribution, p∗g(i) (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m), as the probability that
a worm scan hits group i. Thus,
∑m





There are two types of importance scanning: dynamic importance scanning if
p∗g(i)’s vary with time and static importance scanning if p
∗
g(i)’s are fixed at all time.
For static importance-scanning strategies, assuming that Ω1 = Ω2 = · · · = Ωm = 232m ,
we can relate the group scanning distributions p∗g(i) with the group distributions pg(i)






n ∝ (pg(i))n . (37)
In our study, pg(i)’s represent an underlying group probability distribution of
vulnerable hosts2. pg(i) may or may not be available in advance. An intelligent
2For example, if pg(i) is a uniform distribution, vulnerable hosts are uniformly distributed in the
entire IP address space.
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worm, however, can learn this distribution by observing the measurements (e.g. IP
addresses of vulnerable hosts). Given a set of L measurements for estimating pg(i),
we study a self-learning worm through
1. learning, where attackers (worms) estimate pg(i) using given measurements;
2. sampling, where worms scan the IP-address space based on an optimal use of
the learned vulnerable-host distribution;
3. accessing the performance, where we obtain the speed of worm propagation
through dynamic models for worm spreading;
4. deriving defense strategies for self-learning worms.
4.3 Optimal Static Importance-Scanning Strategy
In this section, we derive an optimal static importance-scanning strategy, assuming
that a vulnerable-host distribution is given.
As stated in the previous chapter, the optimal dynamic importance-scanning strat-
egy is difficult to implement. One alternative selection is the static importance scan-
ning that avoids information exchanges between infected hosts. We design the optimal
strategy for static importance scanning through a new metric. The metric is the av-
erage number of worm scans required until the first scan hits a randomly chosen
vulnerable host. Such a metric is motivated by the intuition that a fewer scans a
worm uses to hit a vulnerable host, the faster the worm spreads.
When a worm scan hits group i (i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}), Ωi hosts in this group are
targeted by that scan with the same likelihood. That is, when considering a vulnerable
host in group i, it has a probability of 1
Ωi
to be hit by a worm scan given that the scan
hits the group. Thus, a vulnerable host in group i is hit by an importance-scanning








Since the events of a vulnerable host being hit are independent in static importance
scanning, the number of scans required until the first scan hits an appointed vulner-
able host in group i, denoted by Fi, follows a geometric distribution [53]
P (Fi = j) = ph(i) (1− ph(i))j−1 , j = 1, 2, · · · . (39)






Therefore, if we randomly choose a vulnerable host in the Internet, the average num-















where Npg(i) is Ni, the number of vulnerable hosts in group i. Intuitively, a good
metric for measuring the effectiveness of scanning strategies is the average number of
scans required for hitting all vulnerable hosts divided by the number of vulnerable
hosts. The expression of this metric, however, is complex and difficult to obtain.
Instead, Y gives an alternative metric for the effectiveness of scanning strategies. A
better static importance-scanning strategy leads to a smaller Y . Thus, the goal of the
static importance scanning is to minimize Y . The optimal static importance-scanning
strategy can be found by the Lagrangian optimization of Y as shown in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3 Among all possible static importance-scanning strategies, the group scan-












Proof: The optimal static importance-scanning strategy can be found by minimizing














For each group i, differentiating with respect to p∗g(i) and setting the result equal to















which leads to Equation (42). Since ∇2J (p∗g(i)
) ≥ 0, p̃∗g(i) is the optimal static
importance-scanning strategy that minimizes Y .

























For example, using pg(i)’s from the /8 subnet distribution of Witty-worm victims,
Ỹmin = 8.6 × 108, and using pg(i)’s from the /8 subnet distribution of Web servers,
Ỹmin = 1.1 × 109. Thus, the /8 subnet distribution of Witty-worm victims is more
vulnerable to a static importance-scanning worm than that of Web servers.
Optimal static importance scanning results in n = 1
2
in Equation (37) and
can be described as:
1. Before a worm is released, attackers first obtain the group distribution of vul-







in the worm code.
2. At each time step t, the worm scans the group i with the probability p∗g(i).
This optimal static importance scanning can be exploited by a self-learning worm
that is described in the next section.
4.4 A Self-Learning Worm Without the Group Distribution
We now assume that the knowledge of the group distribution is not available before a




For practicality, we assume that learning takes place, using as few information ex-
changes between hosts as possible. Such a worm system is shown in Figure 7. A host
with a high Internet bandwidth capacity, called the worm server, is responsible for
collecting and processing information about the IP addresses of infected hosts. An
infected host is called a worm client and may communicate with the worm server, but
not with other infected hosts. If the communication uses Internet relay chat (IRC),
this worm system forms a Botnet [18, 47].
The propagation process of this self-learning worm can be divided into two stages:
• Learning stage: Each infected host (worm client) performs random scanning
or routable scanning [79, 70]. Once a vulnerable host is infected and becomes
a new worm client, it reports its IP address to the worm server. The worm
server records the clients’ IP addresses in a list. When the worm server records
a sufficient number of IP addresses, it estimates the group distribution of the
vulnerable hosts (pg(i)) based on collected data and sends the corresponding
group scanning distribution (p∗g(i)) to all worm clients on the list.
• Importance-scanning stage: Upon receiving p∗g(i), a worm client switches
from either random scanning or routable scanning to static importance scanning
using p∗g(i). The newly infected hosts at this stage do not need to communicate
with the worm server, but perform static importance scanning directly.
This spreading algorithm of the self-learning worm is simple and effective, behaving
in a similar way to the query process in the Napster peer-to-peer system [54].
4.4.2 Estimating the Group Distribution
The propagation speed of the self-learning worm strongly depends on how the worm














Figure 7: A self-learning worm system.
the number of measurements (clients’ IP addresses) collected on the worm server.
How large should L be for accurately estimating the group distribution? We answer
this question by deriving the bias and the variance of an estimator.
Let Li (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m) denote the number of worm clients’ IP addresses from
















j=1 Zj = Li. Since the worm uses random scanning or routable scanning
in the learning stage of worm propagation, Zj follows a Bernoulli distribution with











E[Zj] = pg(i). (46)
This means that the estimator is unbiased, which is desirable.
The variance of the estimator can now be calculated as follows. When j 6= k,






Cov[Zj, Zk] = E[ZjZk]− E[Zj]E[Zk] = −pg(i)1− pg(i)
N − 1 , (47)
which leads to
















· N − L
N − 1 · pg(i)(1− pg(i)). (50)
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Thus, the error of the estimator is the square root of MSE[p̂g(i)]. Note that MSE[p̂g(i)]
mainly depends on L and the vulnerable-host distribution. For example, if L = 500
and N = 12, 000, then MSE[p̂g(i)] = 0.00191 for the /8 subnet distribution of Witty-
worm victims, and MSE[p̂g(i)] = 0.00194 for the /8 subnet distribution of Web
servers. Thus, even using a sample size of 500, a worm can estimate the group
distributions with an error less than
√
2× 10−3 = 4.5 × 10−2 for these two cases.
Meanwhile, as MSE[p̂g(i)] is smaller for the Witty worm than for the Web-attacking












g(i) ≥ 1m . Therefore,
MSE[p̂g(i)] ≤ 1
L
· N − L






This means that we can choose the number of samples L to achieve a desired accuracy
of the estimation. For example, if L = 13, 866, which is the number of Web servers
collected from UROULETTE, we have MSE[p̂g(i)] < 10
−4.
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4.4.3 Final Size of Infection
The proportion estimator given in Equation (45) may miss some groups that contain
vulnerable hosts. That is, for some i, the actual distribution pg(i) > 0, but its
estimator p̂g(i) = 0. If this happens, the self-learning worm based on such a estimator
may never scans some groups that contain vulnerable hosts, resulting in a fewer
number of infected hosts than the total population of vulnerable machines. Let the
total number of hosts infected by the self-learning worm be the final size of infection
Nf . We attempt to answer the question: What is the percentage of vulnerable hosts
that would be missed by a self-learning worm, given L IP addresses of worm clients










1, if the group i is not scanned by the worm;
0, otherwise.
Since the worm uses random scanning or routable scanning in the learning stage of
worm propagation, L1, L2, · · · , Lm form a multinormial distribution, and Xi follows
a Bernoulli distribution with parameter (1−pg(i))L. Then, E[Xi] = (1−pg(i))L, and




. Moreover, when j 6= k, E[XjXk] = P (Xj =
1, Xk = 1) = (1 − pg(j) − pg(k))L. Thus, Cov[Xj, Xk] = E[XjXk] − E[Xj]E[Xk] =
(1− pg(j)− pg(k))L − (1− pg(j))L(1− pg(k))L.






















Both E[pl] and V ar[pl] only depend on the group distribution pg(i) and sample
size L. For example, if L = 500, E[pl] = 0.0279 and V ar[pl] = 4.3080 × 10−5 for
the /8 subnet distribution of Witty-worm victims, and E[pl] = 0.0334 and V ar[pl] =
6.7692×10−5 for the /8 subnet distribution of Web servers. Thus, even using a sample
size of 500, a self-learning worm only misses about 3% vulnerable hosts in these two
cases. Moreover, the worm misses a fewer vulnerable hosts for the Witty worm than
for the Web-server attacking worm.
4.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of self-learning worms empirically, where
the performance refers to the propagation speed of worms as described in Section
4.1. First, we introduce the simulation set-up. We then show the optimality of our
proposed static importance scanning, which is used in the importance-scanning stage
of self-learning worms. We also demonstrate that a self-learning worm can learn the
underlying group distribution in /8 subnets, using as few as 500 samples. Finally, we
compare a self-learning worm with a random-scanning worm, a permutation-scanning
worm, and a Class-A routing worm.
4.5.1 Simulation Set-up
In our simulation, we employ the model in Equation (2) to study the spread of
random-scanning and Class-A routing worms. Meanwhile, we use the model in
Equations (24), (29), and (37) to imitate the propagation of dynamic and static
importance-scanning worms, assuming that the group distribution pg(i) is given. For
a self-learning worm, we adopt the model in Equation (2) to simulate the spread in
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the learning stage and the model in Equations (24) and (37) to emulate the propa-
gation in the importance-scanning stage. There in Equation (37), pg(i) changes to
p̂g(i), and n =
1
2
. To mimic the effect of the self-learning, we simulate 1000 runs for
the importance-scanning stage with estimated group distribution p̂g(i). To generate
p̂g(i), we write a random-scanning worm propagation simulator. When L hosts are
infected, the number of infected hosts in each group (e.g., /8 subnet) is counted, and
the proportion estimator is performed using Equation (45).
The simulated worms have parameters comparable to those of Code Red v2 and
Witty worms. The Code Red v2 worm has a vulnerable population N = 360, 000,
a scanning rate s = 358 per minute, and a hitlist size I0 = 10 [39, 77]. The Witty
worm has a vulnerable population N = 12, 000, a scanning rate s = 1200 per second,
and a hitlist size I0 = 110 [56, 76]. We ignore the effect of disk damage on the spread
in the case of the Witty worm. We also assume that the victims of the Code Red v2
worm have the same distribution as the Web servers. Since the experimental results
of the Witty worm are similar to those of Code Red v2, here we mainly present the
observations for the Code Red v2 worm.
4.5.2 Static Important-Scanning Strategies
We first examine the propagation speed of static importance-scanning strategies.





, 1, 2) as well as the optimal dynamic IS Code Red worm with the /8 subnet
distribution. As expected, when n = 1
2
, static IS infects 99% vulnerable hosts in the
shortest time duration among all static strategies. Therefore, we choose n = 1
2
for a
self-learning worm in the importance-scanning stage. One interesting observation is
that if a static strategy (e.g. n = 2) spreads faster at the early stage, it will propagate
slower at the late stage; or vise verse (e.g. n = 1
3
). This is because a static IS uses
the same group scanning distribution all the time. A larger n corresponds to an IS
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(a) Different choices of n
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 Static IS Code Red with /8 subnet distribution
 Static IS Code Red with /16 subnet distribution
(b) Different amount of knowledge
Figure 8: Comparison of static importance-scanning (IS) strategies.
worm that preferentially scans the groups containing more vulnerable hosts at the
early stage, but unfavorably probes the groups having more left vulnerable hosts at
the late stage. Therefore, attackers may choose a corresponding static IS strategy
based on the purpose of attacks, e.g. infecting some amount of hosts as quickly as
possible.
We also inspect the effect of the amount of knowledge on the spreading speed of
static importance-scanning worms. Figure 8(b) shows the propagation comparison
among a Class-A routing Code Red worm, a static IS Code Red worm with the /8
subnet distribution, and a static IS Code Red worm with the /16 subnet distribution.
Here, static IS Code Red worms use the optimal strategy, i.e. n = 1
2
. We assume that
all three worms have the same scanning rate, although an IS worm may slow down
for a larger payload if it contains more information about the group distribution.
The Class-A routing worm needs 227 minutes to infect 99% vulnerable hosts, while
the static IS worm with the /8 subnet distribution and the /16 subnet distribution
can use only 126 minutes and 25 minutes, respectively. A Class-A routing worm can
be regarded as a worm that only has the knowledge about the routable space in /8
subnets. Therefore, more knowledge about the vulnerable-host distribution may help
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an attacker in designing a faster worm.
4.5.3 Sample Size
Next, we study the effect of the sample size (L) on the spread of a self-learning worm.
Figure 9(a) compares different sample sizes (L = 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000). These self-
learning worms employ random scanning to estimate the /8 subnet distribution in
the learning stage and use the optimal static importance-scanning strategy (i.e. n =
1
2
) in the importance-scanning stage. In this figure, a curve expresses the average
of experimental results over 1000 runs, while an error-bar represents the standard
deviation of experimental results based on 1000 runs. If a self-learning worm uses
fewer samples, it can usually spread faster at the early stage, but propagate with a
larger variation and infect fewer vulnerable hosts at the late stage. This is because
both the MSE in Equation (52) and the expected percentage of vulnerable hosts
missed E[pl] in Equation (55) increase, when the sample size L decreases. We further
plot an example of a self-learning worm with 500 samples in Figure 9(b). This figure
shows the worst case and the best case among 1000 runs for worm propagation,
as well as the average case and the propagation with the actual group distribution
in the importance-scanning stage. It is observed that all four cases close to each
other. Therefore, even with 500 samples, a self-learning worm can estimate the group
distribution accurately.
4.5.4 Self-Learning Worms
Now, we are ready to compare a self-learning worm with a random-scanning worm,
a permutation-scanning worm, and a Class-A routing worm. A self-learning worm
uses either random scanning or routable scanning and collects 500 samples in the





in the importance-scanning stage. In permutation scanning, all worms
share the common pseudo random permutation of the IP address space and coordinate
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(b) A sample size of 500
Figure 9: Effect of sample size.
to provide comprehensive scanning [68]. Such permutation scanning is implemented
by Weaver’s simulator, which uses the 32-bit, 6-round variant of RC5 to generate all
permutations and random numbers. Figure 10(a) shows the propagation compari-
son among a self-learning Code Red worm (average over 1000 runs), a permutation-
scanning Code Red worm, and a random-scanning Code Red worm. It is observed
that the self-learning Code Red worm spends about 50% of the spreading time to in-
fect the first 500 hosts, but uses the left 50% of time to infect the other 3.5×105 hosts.
Thus, the self-learning worm has an astounding spreading speed at the importance-
scanning stage. Figure 10(b) demonstrates the spread of another self-learning Code
Red worm if the worm uses the Class-A routable scanning in the learning stage. Af-
ter collecting the information of 500 worm clients, the self-learning worms (exploiting
random scanning or routable scanning in the learning stage) use only 64 minutes to
infect the other 3.2 × 105 (90%) vulnerable hosts in the importance-scanning stage.
In comparison, a random-scanning Code Red worm, a permutation-scanning Code
Red worm, and a Class-A routing Code Red worm need 293 minutes, 254 minutes,
and 133 minutes, respectively, to infect the same number of vulnerable hosts. Hence,
a simple self-learning process can greatly increase worms’ spreading speed.
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(a) A self-learning Code Red.


























 Class−A routing Code Red
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(b) A self-learning routing Code Red.
Figure 10: Performance of self-learning Code Red worms.
4.6 Detecting and Defending Against Self-Learning Worms
How can we detect and defend against self-learning worms? Our study on self-learning
worms provides the following guidelines:
• When a new application is introduced to the future Internet, how can we deploy
this application? From Equation (41), attackers attempt to minimize Y by
choosing the optimal static group scanning distribution p∗g(i), while defenders
endeavor to maximize Y by customizing the group distribution pg(i). This is a











Similar to the derivation in the previous chapter, we find that the optimal strat-
egy for the defenders is to deploy a new application uniformly in the Internet
for any grouping criteria, such as /8 subnets, /16 subnets, and DNS top-level
domains [26]. Thus, the self-learning process cannot help the worm in speeding
up the propagation. It is a common belief that IPv6 can slow down the spread
of scanning worms effectively due to the large address space. An importance-
scanning worm, however, can have an astonishing spreading speed, if vulnerable
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hosts are still distributed in a non-uniform fashion and the group distribution
can be obtained. On the other hand, current traffic engineering requires the
non-uniform partition of the address space for routing aggregation. How to
balance the tradeoff between traffic engineering and security engineering is a
challenging task for designing the future Internet.
• Since a self-learning worm has an astounding spreading speed at the importance-
scanning stage, defenders need to detect the worm during the learning stage of
worm propagation. Scan or probe detection can be combined with content-
based anomaly detection to improve the speed and the accuracy of detection.
Moreover, a good detection system should be distributed as proposed in [49].
Interestingly, the effectiveness of this worm monitoring system [49] strongly
depends on obtaining the information of the underlying vulnerable-host group
distribution in /8 subnets and /16 subnets. Thus, the weapon race between the
attackers and the defenders relies on how each side can collect and process the
information of the vulnerable-host distribution. The cooperation between the
defenders from different domains provides information sharing and therefore a
possibly more effective detection system [37].
• For the self-learning worm system proposed in this chapter, a key issue in defense
is to detect and disable the worm server before the importance-scanning stage.
One possible method to detect the worm server, for example, is to use the
host contact graph presented in [71]. After detecting the worm server, different
mechanisms can be applied to disable the worm server, for example, putting the
IP address of the worm server in the address blacklist [40]; providing the false
information of worm clients to the worm server; or even performing the denial
of service (DoS) attack on the worm server.
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4.7 Summary
We have characterized attack behaviors through both analysis and simulation. Our
designed “self-learning worm” has the intelligence to gather and process the mea-
surements while propagating and thus increases the propagation speed. Our findings
include
• A worm can learn the group distribution in /8 subnets well, using a proportion
estimator and as few as 500 samples. The estimator is unbiased, and the MSE
of the estimator approximately decreases in reverse proportion to the number
of measurements.
• An optimal yet practical importance-scanning method can be derived based on
static importance sampling to speed up the propagation of a worm.
• A self-learning worm based on parameters chosen from real measurements of
the Code Red v2 worm spreads nearly five times faster than a random-scanning
worm, four times faster than a permutation-scanning worm, and two times faster
than a Class-A routing worm, after collecting 500 samples and estimating the
group distribution in /8 subnets.
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CHAPTER V
SUB-OPTIMAL WORM-SCANNING METHOD: A
LOCALIZED-SCANNING WORM
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, our focus is on localized scanning, which has been used by such
famous worms as Code Red II and Nimda. Localized scanning preferentially searches
for vulnerable hosts in the “local” address space. For example, the Code Red II worm
selects target IP addresses as follows [82]:
• 50% of the time, an address with the same first byte is chosen as the target,
• 37.5% of the time, an address with the same first two bytes is chosen as the
target,
• 12.5% of the time, a random address is chosen.
Song et al. showed that Nimda and Code Red II worms accounted for 90% in-
fection attempts in the seven-week period from September 19 to November 3, 2001
[58]. Why is such a localized strategy so effective? It has been observed that in
the current Internet, a sub-network intends to have many computers with the same
operating systems and applications for easy management [49]. Hence, vulnerable
hosts usually form clusters [8]. Once a vulnerable host in such a subnet is infected, a
localized-scanning worm can rapidly compromise all the other local vulnerable hosts.
The goal of this work is to better understand the spreading ability and character-
istics of localized-scanning worms. Specifically, we attempt to answer the following
questions:
• What is the effect of vulnerable-host distributions on the spread of localized-
scanning worms? The prior work has studied this effect empirically [8, 81, 49].
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In this work, we use mathematical reasoning to show the relationships between
vulnerable-host distributions and localized-scanning worms. Specifically, it is
shown analytically that localized-scanning worms spread slower than random-
scanning worms if vulnerable hosts are uniformly distributed, or faster if highly
unevenly distributed. Moreover, if infected hosts are uniformly distributed,
localized-scanning worms can speed up the propagation with nearly a rate of
the non-uniformity factor that quantifies the non-uniformity of a vulnerable-
host distribution [11].
• What is the propagation capacity of a localized-scanning worm? We design
an optimal localized-scanning strategy that maximizes the localized-scanning
worm propagation speed. Such a strategy dynamically adapts the parameters
used for scanning the local sub-network and the global Internet, based on the
distribution of uninfected vulnerable hosts. Although the optimal localized
scanning is difficult to implement, it provides an upper bound on the spreading
speeds of the currently used localized scanning and its variants. Moreover, we
empirically show that the propagation speed of the currently used localized
scanning can approach that of the optimal strategy.
• What are some possible variants of localized-scanning worms? We study three
variants of localized scanning that can be easily implemented. The first one
makes an infected host focus on scanning either locally or globally. Such a
variant, however, is shown empirically to spread slower and have a larger vari-
ance than localized scanning. Therefore, it may not be a good candidate for
worm attacks. The second variant is inspired by the optimal localized scan-
ning. Specifically, an infected host initiates to scan the local sub-network and
switches to scanning the global Internet when it probes a local host that has
been already infected. Such a strategy makes an infected host adapt scanning
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strategies dynamically, based on the feedback from the probed host. We show
that this simple variant can spread faster than localized scanning and has a
smaller variance. Therefore, this scanning method is a potential tool for attack-
ers. The second variant is easily extended to a “ping-pong” algorithm, which
further improves the worm spreading speed at the late stage.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 provides the
background on localized scanning and vulnerable-host distributions. Section 5.3
shows the effect of vulnerable-host distributions on localized scanning analytically.
Sections 5.4 and 5.5 design the optimum and the variants of localized scanning. Sec-
tion 5.6 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Preliminaries
5.2.1 Localized Scanning
Localized scanning preferentially scans for targets in the address space that is close to
the victim. The basic idea of such a scanning method is that if vulnerable hosts are
clustered, an infected host searching for local hosts would have a higher probability to
find a target than random guessing. Localized scanning has been exploited by Code
Red II and Nimda worms [82, 83]. Moreover, the Blaster worm also uses localized
scanning to select its starting point [85]. The successes of these worms indicate the
effectiveness of such a simple scanning strategy.
In this work, we consider two types of localized scanning (LS). The first type is a
simplified version of LS, called /l LS, which scans the Internet as follows:
• pa (0 ≤ pa ≤ 1) of the time, an address with the same first l bits is chosen as
the target,
• 1− pa of the time, a random address is chosen.
When pa = 0, /l LS is identical to random scanning (RS). Here, we use the classless
inter-domain routing (CIDR) notation. The IPv4 address space is partitioned into
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subnets according to the first l bits of IP addresses, i.e., /l prefixes or /l subnets, where
l ∈ {0, 1, , · · · , 32}. Thus, each /l subnet i (i = 1, 2, · · · , 2l) has 232−l addresses.
The second type is called two-level LS (2LLS), which has been used by the Code
Red II and Nimda worms. 2LLS scans the Internet as follows:
• pb (0 ≤ pb ≤ 1) of the time, an address with the same first byte is chosen as the
target,
• pc (0 ≤ pc ≤ 1 − pb) of the time, an address with the same first two bytes is
chosen as the target,
• 1− pb − pc of the time, a random address is chosen.
For example, for the Code Red II worm, pb = 0.5 and pc = 0.375 [82]; for the Nimda
worm, pb = 0.25 and pc = 0.5 [83].
5.2.2 Vulnerable-Host Distribution
The prerequisite for localized scanning is that vulnerable hosts are non-uniformly
distributed in the Internet. The non-uniformity of vulnerable-host distributions has
been observed in prior work [3, 39, 41, 56, 49, 10]. Taking the distribution of Witty-
worm victims among /16 subnets as an example, we process the data provided by
CAIDA [92] as follows. First, the /16 subnets are sorted decreasingly according to
the number of vulnerable hosts. Then, the empirical cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the percentage of vulnerable hosts in the sorted /16 subnets is computed and
plotted in Figure 11. We find that 1,573 (2.4%) /16 subnets contain 80% vulnerable
hosts, whereas 2,453 (3.7%) /16 subnets hold 90% vulnerable hosts. Therefore, only
a small percentage of /16 subnets contain a large portion of vulnerable hosts, and the
distribution of Witty-worm victims is highly non-uniform.
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Figure 11: CDF of the percentage of Witty-worm victims in sorted /16 subnets.
5.2.3 Non-Uniformity Factor
How can we quantify the non-uniformity of a vulnerable-host distribution? In our
prior work [11], we use a simple metric, called the non-uniformity factor, to measure
the non-uniformity of a distribution.
Let N be the total number of vulnerable hosts and N
(l)
i be the number of vul-




, which is called









A larger non-uniformity factor indicates a more non-uniform distribution. When a
vulnerable-host distribution is uniform among /l subnets, β(l) = 1. For the Witty-
worm victim distribution, β(8) = 12.0 and β(16) = 126.7. We will further discuss the
non-uniformity factor in the next chapter.
5.3 Effect of Vulnerable-Host Distributions on Localized Scan-
ning
In this section, we study the effect of vulnerable-host distributions on localized scan-
ning and compare the spreading dynamics of localized-scanning (LS) worms with
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those of random-scanning (RS) worms by modeling their propagation. As a dynamic
worm-propagation model is non-linear, it is difficult to result in a close-form solution.
Hence, we gain some insights through exploring extreme cases of vulnerable-host and
infected-host distributions among subnets. Specifically, we consider three extreme
cases: (1) Vulnerable hosts are evenly distributed, (2) Vulnerable hosts are highly
unevenly distributed, and (3) Infected hosts are uniformly distributed.
A simple abstract model, known as the susceptible→ infected (SI) model, has been
exploited to model the spread of worms in various earlier work [59, 79]. The SI model
assumes that each host has two states: susceptible and infected. Once infected, a host
stays in the infected state. Here, we adopt a discrete-time SI model. In particular, we
employ the analytical active worm propagation (AAWP) model, which was proposed
by Chen et al. in [8] and has been applied in [49, 30, 70].
5.3.1 Random Scanning
In the AAWP model, the spread of RS worms is characterized as follows [10]:
















where It is the average number of infected hosts at time t (t ≥ 0); N is the total
number of vulnerable hosts; s is the scanning rate; and Ω is the scanning space. Since










5.3.2 /l Localized Scanning





























where i = 1, 2, · · · , 2l; I(l)t,i is the expected number of infected hosts in /l subnet i at
time t (t ≥ 0); N (l)i is the number of vulnerable hosts in /l subnet i; Ωi is the size
of the address space in /l subnet i; and St,i is the average number of scans hitting
/l subnet i during time period (t, t + 1]. Since Ωi = 2






Summing over i = 1, 2, · · · , 2l on both sides of Equation (63), we have
















The average number of scans that fall into /l subnet i during the time period
(t, t + 1] (i.e., St,i) consists of two parts: (a) paI
(l)
t,i s scans from local infected hosts
within subnet i and (b) (1−pa)Its
2l










s, i = 1, 2, · · · , 2l. (65)
Putting Equation (65) into Equation (64), we have
















On the right-hand side of the above equation, the second term represents the random-
scanning component in the /l LS, while the third term corresponds to the preference












t,i , a /l LS
worm should choose a large value of pa to speed up the propagation.
As a close-form expression for It is difficult to obtain, we consider three extreme
cases of vulnerable-host and infected-host distributions. The first case assumes that










































 = (N − It)It, (67)
assuming that the numbers of infected hosts among subnets are not all equal. The
above relation is obtained by the Chebyshev sum inequality [69] or the rearrangement
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inequality [90]. When applying the result of Equation (67) to Equation (66), we obtain
that It+1 < It+
(N−It)Its
Ω
. Therefore, the uniform distribution of vulnerable hosts leads
to a low value of pa for an effective /l LS worm. Moreover, the spread of /l LS worms
is slower than that of RS worms in this case.
The second case assumes that vulnerable hosts are highly unevenly distributed so
that when a /l subnet has more infected hosts, it would also contain more uninfected






i −I(l)t,i > N (l)j −I(l)t,j , i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2l}.











t,i > (N − It)It, (68)
assuming that the numbers of infected hosts among subnets are not all equal. The
above relation is obtained by the Chebyshev sum inequality. When applying the result




for such an extreme case, a large value of pa is preferred for an effective /l LS worm.
Moreover, the spread of /l LS worms is faster than that of RS worms.
The last case assumes a uniform distribution of infected hosts among subnets.
That is, the number of infected hosts in /l subnet i is proportional to the number of
vulnerable hosts in this subnet, i.e., I
(l)
t,i = It ·p(l)g (i), i = 1, 2, · · · , 2l. This assumption
changes Equation (66) to
It+1 = It +
(
1− pa + paβ(l)
) (N − It)Its
Ω
, (69)
where β(l) is the non-uniformity factor as defined in Equation (58). Thus, compared
with RS (Equation (61)), /l LS can increase the propagation speed with a rate of
1− pa + paβ(l). For example, when pa = 0.75, a /8 LS Witty worm can increase the
spreading speed with a factor of 9.25, whereas a /16 LS Witty worm can increase the
speed with a factor of 95.28.
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5.3.3 Two-Level Localized Scanning
For 2LLS, Equation (64) still holds when l = 16. The average number of scans hitting
















where i = 1, 2, · · · , 216; A(8)i denotes the set of /16 subnets that have the same first





t,j represents the expected
number of the infected hosts in the Class-A subnet that has the same first byte of the
address as the /16 subnet i. Putting Equation (70) into Equation (64) and setting
l = 16, we have,




























Similar to /l LS, 2LLS can be shown to spread slower (or faster) than RS if
vulnerable hosts are uniformly (or highly unevenly) distributed1. Moreover, if infected
hosts are uniformly distributed, the model for the 2LLS (i.e., Equation (71)) becomes
It+1 = It +
(
1− pb − pc + pbβ(8) + pcβ(16)
) · (N − It)Its
Ω
. (72)
Comparing Equations (61) with (72), we find that when pc is large and the uniformity
condition of infected hosts holds, a 2LLS worm can speed up the propagation nearly
β(16) times compared with an RS worm.
Our findings provide quantifications to some of the previous observations [8, 81,
49]. For example, when vulnerable hosts are uniformly distributed, an LS worm
propagates slower than an RS worm [8]. On the other hand, when the underlying
vulnerable-host distribution follows nearly a power law, an LS worm can spread much
faster than an RS worm [49].
1We omit the details of derivation for brevity.
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5.4 Optimal Dynamic Localized Scanning
What is the “best-case scenario” for LS worms? How different is the currently used LS
from the optimal LS? To answer these questions, we study the optimal LS, focusing on
/l LS for simplicity. The essential of the optimal LS is to choose the best parameters
(i.e., pa, pb, and pc) to maximize the propagation speed. Intuitively, the optimal LS
should be dynamic and adjust its parameters during the scanning process. Hence,
these parameters depend on the location of infected hosts and vary with time. We
use p
(a)
t,i to denote pa at time t for an infected host in /l subnet i.
5.4.1 Optimal /l Localized Scanning
The optimal /l LS should determine p
(a)
t,i (0 ≤ p(a)t,i ≤ 1) to maximize the probability
of finding an uninfected vulnerable host. To obtain this, we assume that the number
of vulnerable hosts and the number of infected hosts in each subnet at time t (i.e.,
N
(l)
i ’s and I
(l)
t,i ’s) are known to the worm. Therefore, our problem reduces to obtaining
the optimal p
(a)
t,i ’s for worm propagation, given N
(l)
i ’s and I
(l)
t,i ’s.
For the dynamic /l LS, the average number of scans that fall into /l subnet





from local infected hosts within subnet i and (b) 1
2l
∑2l
j=1 (1− p(a)t,j )I(l)t,j s scans from all













where i = 1, 2, · · · , 2l. Putting Equation (73) into Equation (64), we have


















To maximize It+1, p
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That is, if the number of uninfected vulnerable hosts in subnet i is larger than the
average number of uninfected vulnerable hosts among 2l subnets at time t, the infected
hosts in sunbet i should scan only the local subnet; otherwise, the infected hosts
should use random scanning. Thus, the propagation model for the optimal dynamic
/l LS is
















Using this optimal scanning method, a worm starting from a subnet that contains
many vulnerable hosts would first scan locally. The infected hosts in this subnet then
switch from scanning locally to scanning globally later when few uninfected vulnerable
hosts remain. The key is that the worm switches the scanning strategy when it is
aware of the change of the distribution of uninfected vulnerable hosts.
It should be noted that implementing such optimal LS is difficult. First, N
(l)
i ’s
may not be known in advance. Second, to perform this LS, each infected host needs to
know I
(l)
t,i ’s, which leads to numerous information exchanges between infected hosts.
The optimal dynamic LS, however, provides the best scenario of LS and can be used
as the baseline for designing some realistic LS worms.
5.4.2 Optimal Two-Level Localized Scanning
We can easily extend the above derivation to the optimal dynamic 2LLS and conclude
the results here. Similar to p
(a)




t,i (0 ≤ p(b)t,i ≤ 1−p(c)t,i ≤ 1) denote pb and
pc at time t for an infected host in /16 subnet i. Assume that N
(16)
i is the number of
vulnerable hosts in /16 subnet i; I
(16)
t,i is the number of infected hosts in /16 subnet
i at time t; and A
(8)
i is the set of /16 subnets that have the same first byte of the
subnet address as /16 subnet i. Three items, N
(16)





j − I(16)t,j ),
and 1
216
(N − It), are compared. The corresponding optimal 2LLS worm-scanning
strategy is summarized in Table 2.
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Table 2: Summary of the optimal 2LLS.
Compare three items Result Scanning strategy Meaning







j − I(16)t,j ), second p(b)t,i = 1, p(c)t,i = 0 scan the local /8 subnet
1
216
(N − It)} third p(b)t,i = p(c)t,i = 0 scan the global Internet
5.4.3 Experimental Results
In our experiments, we simulate the spread of a Witty worm, which has a vulnerable
population N = 55, 909 [92] and a scanning rate s = 1, 200 per second [56]. The effect
of disk damage on the Witty worm propagation is ignored. The worm is assumed to
begin spreading from one initially infected host (i.e., I0 = 1).
We evaluate the propagation speed of optimal LS worms by two methods. The first
method is the numerical analysis of the worm propagation models. Specifically, the
spread of /l LS worms is simulated by Equations (62) and (65), while the propagation
of 2LLS worms is implemented by Equations (62) and (70). The optimal /l LS uses
Equations (62), (73), and (75). RS is regarded as a special case of the /l LS when
pa = 0 and an extreme example of the 2LLS when pb = pc = 0. The initially infected
host is assumed to be located in the subnet that contains the smallest number of
vulnerable hosts. Figure 12(a) compares the propagation speeds of RS, optimal /8
LS, and the /8 LS with pa = 0.75. Figure 12(b) compares the spreading speeds of
optimal 2LLS and the 2LLS with pb = 0.25 and pc = 0.5. It is shown that LS can
spread the worm much faster than RS, and the spreading speed of the currently used
LS (i.e., 2LLS) can approach that of the optimal LS.
The second evaluation method uses a discrete event simulator to imitate the spread
of LS worms. Our simulator implements each worm scan through a random number
generator and simulates each scenario with 100 runs using different seeds. The initially
infected host is located in the subnet that contains the largest number of vulnerable
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Figure 12: Numerical analysis of (optimal) LS worm propagation.
hosts. Figure 13(a) plots the mean and the variance of /16 LS worm propagation with
pa = 0.75. If a worm has a smaller variance, its spread is more predictable and stable.
The “5%” (or “95%”) propagation curve denotes that a worm spreads no slower (or
faster) than this curve in 95 out of 100 simulation runs. The standard derivation
(STD) error-bar reflects the variance of worm propagation among 100 simulation
runs. It is observed that a /16 LS infected 50,318 (90%) vulnerable hosts in 138
seconds averagely. Figure 13(b) plots the simulation results of optimal /16 LS worm
propagation. Such an optimal worm only takes 65 seconds to infected 90% vulnerable
hosts. Moreover, the optimal /16 LS has a smaller variance compared with the /16
LS.
5.5 Variants of Localized Scanning
In this section, we study three variants of LS that can be easily implemented and do
not require information exchanges between infected hosts.
5.5.1 Decision-First Localized Scanning
The first variant is called decision-first localized scanning (DFLS). Instead of com-
bining local scanning and global scanning, DFLS makes an infected host focus on
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(a) /16 LS.
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 5% of optimal /16 LS
 95% of optimal /16 LS
(b) Optimal /16 LS.
Figure 13: Simulations of /16 LS and optimal /16 LS worm propagation.
scanning either locally or globally. For example, when a host is infected, it flips a
coin and makes a decision:
• Scan only the local /l subnet with probability pa,
• Scan globally with probability 1− pa.
This scanning strategy is called /l DFLS, which is the counterpart of /l LS. Since
in a /l subnet pa percentage of infected hosts scan locally and 1 − pa percentage of
infected hosts use random scanning, Equations (62) and (65) still hold for /l DFLS.
We write a simulator to imitate the spread of DFLS worms and use the same
setting as in Figure 13. Figure 14 plots the mean and the variance of /16 DFLS
worm propagation with pa = 0.75. It is observed that /16 DFLS spreads slower than
/16 LS and on average takes 140 seconds to infect 40,000 vulnerable hosts. Moreover,
/16 DFLS has a large variance as shown in the figure. This is because each infected
host scans only either locally or globally. The hosts scanning globally have a slower
speed to find a target. On the other hand, the hosts scanning locally waste scans after
the local infected hosts become saturated. Thus, DFLS lacks a randomized algorithm
to search for targets both locally and globally and may not be a good candidate for
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Figure 14: Simulations of /16 DFLS worm propagation.
worm attacks.
5.5.2 Feedback Localized Scanning and Ping-Pong Localized Scanning
The second variant is called feedback localized scanning (FLS), which is inspired by
the optimal LS. The optimal strategy adapts the scanning methods, based on the
local density of uninfected vulnerable hosts. In the similar way, we design a variant
of LS, based on the feedback from the local probed host. For example, an infected
host behaves as follows:
• First, initiates to scan the local /l subnet until probing a local host that has
been already infected,
• Then, switches from scanning locally to scanning the global Internet.
This scanning strategy is called /l FLS. The basic idea is that when the infected host
probes a local host that has been already infected, it realizes that the infected hosts
in the subnet probably have become saturated and had better switch to scanning
globally.
We also write a simulator for FLS and show the results in Figure 15. Figure 15(a)
plots the mean and the variance of /16 FLS worm propagation. It is observed that /16
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(a) /16 FLS.

































(b) Number of infected hosts scanning locally.
Figure 15: Simulations of /16 FLS worm propagation.
FLS takes only 93 seconds to infect 90% vulnerable hosts and further approaches the
spreading capacity of the optimal /16 LS. Moreover, /16 FLS has a small variance.
Figure 15(b) further plots how the number of infected hosts that scans locally changes
with time. It is shown that the number first increases with time and reaches the
maximum after about 40 seconds and then decreases with time. This indicates that
in the beginning many infected hosts focus on scanning locally and later switch to
scanning globally. Therefore, FLS shows a better performance than the original LS
and can be a potential tool for attackers.
FLS can further be extended to a “ping-pong” localized scanning (PPLS) method
by adding the following algorithm:
• An infected host that uses random scanning will switch to scanning the local /l
subnet when it probes a host that has been already infected.
Thus, an infected host switches between local scanning and global scanning, in an
attempt to adapt to the underlying distribution of uninfected vulnerable hosts. Figure
16 plots the mean and the variance of /16 PPLS worm propagation. /16 PPLS further
improves worm propagation at the late stage and only takes 81 seconds to infected
90% vulnerable hosts.
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Figure 16: Simulations of /16 PPLS worm propagation.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we attempt to understand the behaviors of localized-scanning (LS)
worms through both analysis and simulation. We have shown analytically that an
LS worm spreads slower than a random-scanning (RS) worm if the vulnerable-host
distribution is uniform, or faster if highly uneven. Moreover, if the infected hosts are
uniformly distributed, the LS method can increase the spreading speed by nearly a
non-uniformity factor compared with the RS scheme.
We have designed the optimal dynamic LS worms. The spreading speed of such
optimal LS can be approached by the currently used LS, showing that the existing LS
is near-optimal. We have also constructed three variants of LS. While the decision-
first localized scanning (DFLS) shows a poor performance empirically, the feedback
localized scanning (FLS) and the ping-pong localized scanning (PPLS) demonstrate
better performances than the original LS and can be good candidates for worm at-
tacks. The key of FLS and PPLS is that a worm adapts its scanning strategies based




WORM ATTACKS AND DEFENSE
6.1 Introduction
Worm scanning has become more and more sophisticated since the initial attacks
of Internet worms. Most of the real, especially “old” worms, such as Code Red [39],
Slammer [41], and latter Witty [56], exploit naive random scanning that chooses target
IP addresses uniformly and does not use any information on network vulnerabilities.
Advanced scanning methods, however, have been developed that take the IP address
structure into consideration. One example is routable scanning that selects targets
only in the routable address space, using the information provided by the BGP routing
table [70, 79]. Another example is evasive worms that exploit lightweight sampling
to obtain the knowledge of live subnets of the address space and spread only in these
networks [48].
This chapter focuses on a class of network-aware worms. Such worms exploit the
information on the highly uneven distributions of vulnerable hosts. The vulnerable-
host distributions have been observed to be bursty and spatially inhomogeneous by
Barford et al. [3]. A non-uniform distribution of Witty-worm victims has been
reported by Rajab et al. [49]. We have also found that a Web-server distribution is
non-uniform in the IP address space [10]. These discoveries suggest that vulnerable
hosts and Web servers may be “clustered” (i.e., non-uniform). The clustering/non-
uniformity makes the network vulnerable since if one host is compromised in a cluster,
the rest may be compromised rather quickly.
In our prior chapters, we have studied a class of “worst-case” worms, called
importance-scanning worms, which exploit non-uniform vulnerable-host distributions
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[10, 16]. Importance scanning is developed from and named after importance sam-
pling in statistics. Importance scanning probes the Internet according to an underly-
ing vulnerable-host distribution. Such a scanning method forces worm scans on the
most relevant parts of an address space and supplies the optimal strategy1. Impor-
tance scanning thus provides a “what-if” scenario: When there are many ways for
intelligent worms to exploit such a vulnerability, importance scanning is a worst-case
threat-model. Hence, importance scanning can serve as a benchmark for studying
real worms.
Are there any real network-aware worms? Code Red II and Nimda worms have
used localized scanning [82, 83]. Localized scanning preferentially searches for vul-
nerable hosts in the “local” address space. The Blaster worm has used sequential
scanning in addition to localized scanning [85]. Sequential scanning searches for vul-
nerable hosts through their closeness in the IP address space. It is not well understood,
however, how to characterize the relationships between vulnerable-host distributions
and these network-aware worms.
What has been observed is that real network-aware and importance-scanning
worms spread much faster than random-scanning worms [49, 10]. This shows the
importance of the problem. Does there exist a generic characteristic across different
vulnerable-host distributions? If so, how do intelligent worms exploit such a vulner-
ability, and how can we defend against such worms?
Our goal is to investigate such a generic characteristic in vulnerable-host distribu-
tions, to quantify its relationship with network-aware worms, and to understand the
effectiveness of defense strategies. In particular, we would like to answer the following
questions:
• How to quantify the non-uniformity of a vulnerable-host distribution by a simple
1Hitlist scanning [60] can be regarded as a special case of importance scanning when the complete
information of vulnerable hosts is known.
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metric?
• How to measure the spreading ability of network-aware worms quantitatively?
• How to relate vulnerable-host distributions with network-aware worm spreading
ability?
• What are the challenges to defense strategies on slowing down the spread of a
network-aware worm?
To answer these questions, we first observe, from five measurement sets, com-
mon characteristics of non-uniform vulnerable-host distributions. We then derive
a new metric as the non-uniformity factor to characterize the non-uniformity of a
vulnerable-host distribution. A larger non-uniformity factor reflects a more non-
uniform distribution of vulnerable hosts. We obtain the non-uniformity factors from
the data sets on vulnerable-host distributions and show that all data sets have large
non-uniformity factors. Moreover, the non-uniformity factor is a function of the Renyi
entropy, a generalized entropy, of order two [50]. We show that the non-uniformity
factor better characterizes the unevenness of a distribution than the Shannon en-
tropy. Therefore, in view of information theory, the non-uniformity factor provides a
quantitative measure of the unevenness/uncertainty of a vulnerable-host distribution.
Next, we analyze the spreading speed of network-aware worms, especially at an
early stage. A worm that spreads faster at the early stage can in general infect most of
the vulnerable hosts in a shorter time. The propagation ability of a worm at the early
stage is characterized by the infection rate [79]. Therefore, we derive the infection
rates of network-aware worms. We find that the infection rates of representative
network-aware worms can be represented explicitly as a function of the non-uniformity
factor. For example, localized scanning can increase the infection rate by nearly the
non-uniformity factor, comparing to random scanning. Thus, the spreading speed of
localized scanning can approach the capacity of sub-optimal importance scanning [10].
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These analytical results on the relationships between vulnerable-host distributions
and network-aware worm spreading ability are validated by simulation. Furthermore,
to show the generality of our approach, we study sequential scanning. We demonstrate
that a combination of sequential scanning and random scanning can increase the
infection rate significantly.
Finally, we study new challenges to worm defense posed by network-aware worms.
Using the non-uniformity factor, we show quantitatively that the host-based defense
strategies, such as proactive protection [7] and virus throttling [63], should be de-
ployed at almost all hosts to slow down network-aware worms at the early stage. A
partial deployment would nearly invalidate such host-based defense. Moreover, we
demonstrate that the infection rate of a network-aware worm in the IPv6 Internet
can be comparable to that of the Code Red v2 worm in the IPv4 Internet. Therefore,
fighting network-aware worms is a real challenge.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 presents our col-
lected data sets. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 introduce a new metric called the non-uniformity
factor and compare this metric to the Shannon entropy. Sections 6.5 and 6.6 char-
acterize the spreading ability of network-aware worms through theoretical analysis
and simulations. Section 6.7 further studies the effectiveness of defense strategies on
network-aware worms. Section 6.8 concludes this chapter.
6.2 Measurements and Vulnerable-Host Distribution
How significant is the unevenness of vulnerable-host distributions? To answer this
question, we study five data sets.
6.2.1 Measurements
DShield (D1): DShield collects intrusion detection system (IDS) logs [84]. Specifi-
cally, DShield provides the information of vulnerable hosts by aggregating logs from
more than 1,600 IDSes distributed throughout the Internet. We further focus on the
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following ports that were attacked by worms: 80 (HTTP), 135 (DCE/RPC), 445 (Net-
BIOS/SMB), 1023 (FTP servers and the remote shell attacked by W32.Sasser.E.Worm),
and 6129 (DameWare).
iSinks (P1 and C1): Two unused address space monitors run the iSink system
[75]. The monitors record the unwanted traffic arriving at the unused address spaces
that include a Class-A network (referred to as “Provider” or P1) and two Class B
networks at the campus of the University of Wisconsin (referred to as “Campus” or
C1) [3].
Witty-worm victims (W1): A list of Witty-worm victims is provided by CAIDA
[56]. CAIDA used a network telescope with approximate 224 IP addresses to log the
traffic of Witty-worm victims that are Internet security systems (ISS) products.
Web-server list (W2): IP addresses of Web servers were collected through UROULETTE
(http://www.uroulette.com/). UROULETTE provides a random uniform resource
locator (URL) generator to obtain a list of IP addresses of Web servers.
The first three data sets (D1, P1, and C1) were collected over a seven-day period
from 10-16 December 2004 and have been studied in [3] to demonstrate the bursty
and spatially inhomogeneous distribution of (malicious) source IP addresses. The
last two data sets (W1 and W2) have been used in our prior work [10] to show the
virulence of importance-scanning worms. The summary of our data sets is given in
Table 3.
Table 3: Summary of the data sets.




W1 Witty-worm victims 55,909
W2 Web servers 13,866
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6.2.2 Vulnerable-Host Distribution
To obtain vulnerable-host group distributions, we use the classless inter-domain rout-
ing (CIDR) notation [34]. The Internet is partitioned into subnets according to the
first l bits of IP addresses, i.e., /l prefixes or /l subnets. In this division, there are
2l subnets, and each subnet contains 232−l addresses, where l ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 32}. For
example, when l = 8, the Internet is grouped into Class-A subnets (i.e., /8 subnets);
when l = 16, the Internet is partitioned into Class-B subnets (i.e., /16 subnets).
We plot the complementary cumulative distribution functions (CCDF) of our col-
lected data sets in /8 and /16 subnets in Figure 17 in log-log scales. CCDF is defined
as the faction of the subnets with the number of hosts greater than a given value.
Figure 17(a) shows population distributions in /8 subnets for D1, P1, C1, W1, and
W2, whereas Figure 17(b) exhibits host distributions in /16 subnets for D1 with dif-
ferent ports (80, 135, 445, 1023, and 6129). Figure 17 demonstrates a wide range
of populations, indicating highly inhomogeneous address structures. Specifically, the
relatively straight lines, such as W2 and D1-135, imply that vulnerable hosts follow
a power law distribution. Similar observations were given in [3, 49, 46, 39, 41, 10].
Why is the vulnerable-host distribution non-uniform in the IPv4 address space?
First, no vulnerable hosts can exist in reserved or multicast address ranges [87].
Second, different subnet administrators make different use of their own IP address
space. Third, a subnet intends to have many computers with the same operating
systems and applications for easy management [59, 8]. Last, some subnets are more
protected than others [3, 49].
How can we quantify the non-uniformity of a vulnerable-host distribution? One
way is to use the population distribution such as CCDF plotted in Figure 17. But it































































(b) Population distributions in /16 subnets.
Figure 17: CCDF of collected data sets.
6.3 Non-Uniformity Factor
In this section, we derive a simple metric, called the non-uniformity factor, to quantify
the non-uniformity of a vulnerable-host distribution.
6.3.1 Definition and Property
Let p
(l)
g (i) (i = 1, 2, · · · , 2l) denote the group distribution of vulnerable hosts in /l
subnets. Let N
(l)
i be the number of vulnerable hosts in /l subnet i and N be the
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The above inequality is derived by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. The equality holds
if and only if p
(l)
g (i) = 2−l, for i = 1, 2, · · · , 2l. In other words, when the vulnerable-




g (i) ≥ 0,










The equality holds when p
(l)
g (j) = 1 for some j and p
(l)
g (i) = 0, i 6= j, i.e., all vul-
nerable hosts concentrate on one subnet. This means that when the vulnerable-host
distribution is extremely non-uniform, β(l) obtains the maximum value 2l. There-
fore, β(l) characterizes the non-uniformity of a vulnerable-host distribution. A larger
non-uniformity factor reflects a more non-uniform distribution of vulnerable hosts.








, address i is vulnerable to the worm;
0, otherwise,
(80)
which results in β(32) = 2
32
N
. More importantly, β(l) is a non-decreasing function of l,
as shown below.
Theorem 4 If l > r, β(l) ≥ β(r), where l, r ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 32}.
Proof: Let k = l − r. Group i (i = 1, 2, · · · , 2r) of /r subnets is partitioned into





k · (i− 1) + j), i = 1, 2, · · · , 2r. (81)










































































(a) Five data sets.

































(b) D1 with different ports.
Figure 18: Non-uniformity factors of collected data sets. The y-axis uses a log scale.
The equality holds when p
(l)




, j = 1, 2, · · · , 2k, i = 1, 2, · · · , 2r.
That is, in each /r subnet, the vulnerable hosts are uniformly distributed in 2k groups.
An intuitive explanation of this theorem is as follows. For /l and /(l +1) subnets,
group i (i = 1, 2, · · · , 2l) of /l subnets is partitioned into groups 2i − 1 and 2i of
/(l + 1) subnets. If vulnerable hosts in each group of /l subnets are equally divided
into groups of /(l + 1) subnets (i.e., p
(l+1)
g (2i − 1) = p(l+1)g (2i) = 12p
(l)
g (i), ∀ i), then
β(l+1) = β(l). Otherwise, if the division of vulnerable hosts is uneven for a group (i.e.,
p
(l+1)
g (2i− 1) 6= p(l+1)g (2i), ∃ i), then β(l+1) > β(l).
6.3.2 Estimated Non-Uniformity Factor
Figure 18 shows the non-uniformity factors estimated from our data sets. The non-
uniformity factors increase with the prefix length for all data sets. The y-axis is in
a log scale. Thus, β(l) increases almost exponentially with a wide range of l. To gain
intuition on how large β(l) can be, β(8) and β(16) are summarized for all data sets in
Table 4. We observe that β(8) and β(16) have large values, indicating the significant
unevenness of collected distributions.
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Table 4: β(8) and β(16) of collected distributions.
β(l) D1 P1 C1 W1 W2
β(8) 7.9 8.4 9.0 12.0 7.8
β(16) 31.2 43.2 52.2 126.7 50.2
β(l) D1-80 D1-135 D1-445 D1-1023 D1-6129
β(8) 7.9 15.4 10.5 48.2 9.1
β(16) 153.3 186.6 71.7 416.3 128.9
6.4 Entropy and Non-Uniformity Factor
It is well-known that the Shannon entropy can be used to measure the non-uniformity
of a distribution [20]. Why do we choose the non-uniformity factor instead?













, for q 6= 1, (85)
where P (l) = {p(l)g (1), p(l)g (2), · · · , p(l)g (2l)}. The non-uniformity factor can relate to
the Renyi entropy of order two in the following equation:
β(l) = 2l−H2(P
(l)). (86)
Thus, the non-uniformity factor is essentially an entropy.




= −∑2li=1 p(l)g (i) log2 p(l)g (i), is a special case of the












Figure 19 shows the Shannon entropies of our empirical distributions from the data




= l as denoted by the diagonal line
in the figure. On the other hand, if a distribution is extremely non-uniform, e.g.,









and 0 in Figure 19 reflects how uniform a distribution is. Similarly,
the distance between β(l) and the horizontal access 1 in Figure 18 measures the




corresponds to a more even distribution,
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(a) Five data sets.
























(b) D1 with different ports.
Figure 19: Shannon entropies of collected data sets.
whereas a larger β(l) corresponds to a more non-uniform distribution. Evidenced by
Figure 18, the non-uniformity factor magnifies the unevenness of a distribution. In
addition, if two distributions have different prefix lengths, we can directly apply the
non-uniformity factor to compare the unevenness between them. Therefore, the non-
uniformity factor provides a better measure for describing the non-uniformity of a
distribution.
More importantly, the non-uniformity factor can directly reflect how much faster
a network-aware worm spreads than a random-scanning worm, which is shown in the
next section.
From an information theoretical viewpoint, the entropy provides a quantitative
measure of uncertainty. The uncertainty of a vulnerable-host probability distribution
is important for an attacker to design an intelligent network-aware worm. If there is no
uncertainty about the distribution of vulnerable hosts (e.g., either all vulnerable hosts
are concentrated on a subnet or all information about vulnerable hosts is known), the
entropy is minimum, and the worm that uses the information on the distribution can
spread fastest by employing the optimal importance scanning [10]. On the other hand,
if there is maximum uncertainty (e.g., vulnerable hosts are uniformly distributed), the
entropy is maximum. But the worm cannot take advantage of the information of the
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distribution and can only use random scanning. Moreover, when an attacker obtains
more information about the vulnerable-host distribution, in general, the resulting
worm can spread faster.
6.5 Network-Aware Worm Spreading Ability
How to quantify the spreading speed of a network-aware worm with the information
of a vulnerable-host distribution? We characterize the spread of a network-aware
worm at an early stage by deriving the infection rate.
6.5.1 Infection Rate
The infection rate, denoted by α, is defined as the average number of vulnerable
hosts that can be infected per unit time by one infected host during the early stage
of worm propagation [79]. The infection rate is an important metric for studying
network-aware worm spreading ability for two reasons. First, since the number of
infected hosts increases exponentially with the rate 1 + α during the early stage, a
worm with a higher infection rate can spread much faster at the beginning and thus
infect a large number of hosts in a shorter time [10]. Second, while it is generally
difficult to derive a close-form solution for dynamic worm propagation, we can obtain
a close-form expression of the infection rate for different worm-scanning methods.
Let R denote the (random) number of vulnerable hosts that can be infected per
unit time by one infected host during the early stage of worm propagation. The
infection rate is the expected value of R, i.e., α = E[R]. Let s be the scanning rate
or the number of scans sent by an infected host per unit time, N be the number of
vulnerable hosts, and Ω be the scanning space (i.e., Ω = 232).
For random scanning (RS) [79, 10], an infected host sends out s random scans per




follows a Binomial distribution B(s, N
Ω
)2, resulting in





We derive the infection rates of importance scanning (IS) [10, 16]. An infected host




g (i) is called the group scanning distri-
bution and is to be chosen with respect to the group distribution p
(l)
g (i). If a worm scan




232−l to find a vulnerable host. Thus,
































The same result was derived in [10] but by a different approach.
We now consider a special case of IS, where the group scanning distribution q
(l)
g (i)














2 = αRS · β(l). (90)
Compared with RS, this /l IS can increase the infection rate by a factor of β(l).
Such an infection rate can be considered as a benchmark for comparison with other
network-aware worms.
6.5.3 Localized Scanning
Localized scanning (LS) has been used by such real worms as Code Red II and Nimda
[49, 8]. We first consider a simplified version of LS, called /l LS, which scans the
Internet as follows:
2In our derivation, we ignore the dependency of the events that different scans hit the same target
at the early stage of worm propagation.
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• pa (0 ≤ pa ≤ 1) of the time, an address with the same first l bits is chosen as
the target,
• 1− pa of the time, a random address is chosen.
Assume that an initially infected host is randomly chosen from the vulnerable hosts.
Let Ig denote the subnet where an initially infected host locates. Thus, P (Ig = i) =
p
(l)
g (i), where i = 1, 2, · · · , 2l. For an infected host located in /l subnet i, a scan from
this host probes globally with the probability of 1 − pa and hits /l subnet j (j 6= i)
with the likelihood of 1−pa
2l













where j = 1, 2, · · · , 2l. Given the subnet location of an initially infected host, we
can apply the results of IS. Specifically, putting Equation (91) into Equation (89), we
have










Therefore, we can compute the infection rate of /l LS as
α
(l)
LS = E[R] = E[E[R|Ig]] =
2l∑
i=1






1− pa + paβ(l)
)
. (94)
Since β(l) > 1 (β(l) = 1 is for a uniform distribution and is excluded here), α
(l)
LS
increases with respect to pa. Specifically, when pa → 1, α(l)LS → αRSβ(l) = α(l)IS. Thus,
/l LS has an infection rate comparable to that of /l IS. In reality, pa cannot be 1. This
is because an LS worm begins spreading from one infected host that is specifically in
a subnet; and if pa = 1, the worm can never spread out of this subnet. Therefore, we
expect that the optimal value of pa should be large but not 1.
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Next, we further consider another LS, called two-level LS (2LLS), which has been
used by the Code Red II and Nimda worms [82, 83]. 2LLS scans the Internet as
follows:
• pb (0 ≤ pb ≤ 1) of the time, an address with the same first byte is chosen as the
target,
• pc (0 ≤ pc ≤ 1 − pb) of the time, an address with the same first two bytes is
chosen as the target,
• 1− pb − pc of the time, a random address is chosen.
For example, for the Code Red II worm, pb = 0.5 and pc = 0.375 [82]; for the Nimda
worm, pb = 0.25 and pc = 0.5 [83]. Using the similar analysis for /l LS, we can derive
the infection rate of 2LLS:
α2LLS = αRS
(
1− pb − pc + pbβ(8) + pcβ(16)
)
. (95)
Since β(16) ≥ β(8) ≥ 1 from Theorem 4, α2LLS holds or increases when both pb and
pc increase. Specially, when pc → 1, α2LLS → αRSβ(16) = α(16)IS . Thus, 2LLS has an
infection rate comparable to that of /16 IS. Moreover, β(16) is much larger than β(8)
as shown in Table 4 for the collected distributions. Hence, pc is more significant than
pb for 2LLS.
6.5.4 Modified Sequential Scanning
The Blaster worm is a real worm that exploits sequential scanning in combination
with localized scanning. A sequential-scanning worm studied in [81, 30] begins to
scan addresses sequentially from a randomly chosen starting IP address and has a
similar propagation speed as a random-scanning worm. The Blaster worm selects its
starting point locally as the first address of its Class-C subnet with probability 0.4
[85, 81]. To analyze the effect of sequential scanning, we do not incorporate localized
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scanning. Specifically, we consider our /l modified sequential-scanning (MSS) worm,
which scans the Internet as follows:
• Newly infected host A begins with random scanning until finding a vulnerable
host with address B.
• After infecting the target B, host A continues to sequentially scan IP addresses
B + 1, B + 2, · · · (or B − 1, B − 2, · · · ) in the /l subnet where B locates.
Such a sequential worm-scanning strategy is in a similar spirit to the nearest neighbor
rule, which is widely used in pattern classification [19]. The basic idea is that if
the vulnerable hosts are clustered, the neighbor of a vulnerable host is likely to be
vulnerable also.
Such a /l MSS worm has two stages. In the first stage (called MSS 1), the worm
uses random scanning and has an infection rate of αRS, i.e., αMSS 1 = αRS. In the
second stage (called MSS 2), the worm scans sequentially in a /l subnet. The fist
l bits of a target address are fixed, whereas the last 32 − l bits of the address are
generated additively or subtractively and are modulated by 232−l. Let Ig denote the
sunbet where B locates. Thus, P (Ig = i) = p
(l)
g (i), where i = 1, 2, · · · , 2l. Since a




232−l to hit a vulnerable host,
E[R|Ig = i] = N
(l)
i
232−l s = αRS · 2lp
(l)
g (i), which leads to
αMSS 2 = E[R] = E[E[R|Ig]] = αRS · β(l). (96)
Therefore, the infection rate of /l MSS is between αRS and αRSβ
(l).
In Summary, the infection rates of all three network-aware worms (IS, LS, and
MSS) can be far larger than that of an RS worm, depending on the non-uniformity
factors.
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6.6 Simulation and Validation
In this section, we validate our analytical results through simulations and the collected
data sets.
6.6.1 Infection Rate
We first focus on validating infection rates. We apply the discrete event simulation
to our experiments [52]. Specifically, we simulate the searching process of a worm
using different scanning methods at the early stage. We use the C1 data set for
the vulnerable-host distribution. The worm spreads over the C1 distribution with
N = 448, 894 and has a scanning rate s = 100. Note that the C1 distribution has the
non-uniformity factors β(8) = 9.0 and β(16) = 52.2. The simulation stops when the
worm has sent out 103 scans for RS, /16 IS, /16 LS, and 2LLS, and 65,535 scans for
/16 MSS 2. Then, we count the number of vulnerable hosts hit by the worm scans
and compute the infection rate. The results are averaged over 104 runs. Table 5
compares the simulation results (i.e., sample mean) with the analytical results (i.e.,
Equations (88), (90), (94), (95), and (96)). Here, a /16 LS worm uses pa = 0.75,
whereas a 2LLS worm employs pb = 0.25 and pc = 0.5. We observe that the sample
means and the analytical results are almost identical.
Table 5: Infection rates of different scanning methods.
Scanning method RS /16 IS /16 LS 2LLS /16 MSS 2
Analytical result 0.0105 0.5456 0.4118 0.2989 0.5456
Sample mean 0.0103 0.5454 0.4023 0.2942 0.5489
Sample variance 0.0010 0.0543 0.2072 0.1053 0.3186
We observe that network-aware worms have much larger infection rates than
random-scanning worms. LS indeed increases the infection rate with nearly the non-
uniformity factor and approaches the capacity of sub-optimal IS. This is significant
as LS only depends on one or two parameters (i.e., pa for /l LS and pb, pc for 2LLS),
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while IS requires the information of the vulnerable-host distribution. On the other
hand, LS has a larger sample variance than IS as indicated by Table 5. This implies
that the infection speed of an LS worm depends on the location of initially infected
hosts. If the LS worm begins spreading from a subnet containing densely populated
vulnerable hosts, the worm would spread rapidly. Furthermore, we notice that the
MSS worm also has a large infection rate at the second stage, indicating that MSS
can indeed exploit the clustering pattern of the distribution. Meanwhile, the large
sample variance of the infection rate of MSS 2 reflects that an MSS worm strongly
depends on the initially infected hosts. We further compute the infection rate of a
/16 MSS worm that includes both random-scanning and sequential-scanning stages.
Simulation results are averaged over 106 runs and are summarized in Table 6. These
results strongly depend on the total number of worm scans. When the number of
worm scans is small, an MSS worm behaves similar to a random-scanning worm.
When the number of worm scans increases, the MSS worm spends more scans on the
second stage and thus has a larger infection rate.
Table 6: Infection rates of a /16 MSS worm.
# of worm scans 10 100 1000 10000 50000
Sample mean 0.0108 0.0190 0.0728 0.2866 0.4298
Sample variance 0.1246 0.1346 0.1659 0.2498 0.2311
6.6.2 Dynamic Worm Propagation
An infection rate only characterizes the early stage of worm propagation. We now
employ the analytical active worm propagation (AAWP) model and its extensions to
characterize the entire spreading process of worms [8]. Specifically, the spread of RS
and IS worms is implemented as described in [10], whereas the propagation of LS
worms is modeled according to [49]. The parameters that we use to simulate a worm
are comparable to those of the Code Red v2 worm. Code Red v2 has a vulnerable
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Figure 20: A network-aware worm spreads over the D1-80 distribution.
population N = 360, 000 and a scanning rate s = 358 per minute [77]. We assume
that the worm begins spreading from an initially infected host that is located in the
subnet containing the largest number of vulnerable hosts.
We first show the propagation speeds of network-aware worms for the same vulnerable-
host distribution from data set D1-80. From Section 6.5, we expect that a network-
aware worm can spread much faster than an RS worm. Figure 20 demonstrates such
an example on a worm that uses different scanning methods. It takes an RS worm
10 hours to infect 99% of vulnerable hosts, whereas a /8 LS worm with pa = 0.75 or
a /8 IS worm takes only about 3.5 hours. A /16 LS worm with pa = 0.75 or a 2LLS
worm with pb = 0.25 and pc = 0.5 can further reduce the time to 1 hour. A /16 IS
worm spreads fastest and takes only 0.5 hour.
We also study the effect of vulnerable-host distributions on the propagation of









Thus, we expect that a network-aware worm using the /16 D1-1023 distribution would
spread faster than using other three distributions. Figure 21 verifies this through
the simulations of the spread of a 2LLS worm that uses different vulnerable-host
distributions (i.e., D1-1023, W1, C1, and D1). Here, the 2LLS worm employs the
same parameters as the Nimda worm, i.e., pb = 0.25 and pc = 0.5. As expected, the
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Figure 21: A 2LLS worm spreads over different distributions.
worm using the D1-1023 distribution spreads fastest, especially at the early stage of
worm propagation.
6.7 Effectiveness of defense strategies
What are new requirements and challenges for a defense system to slow down the
spread of a network-aware worm? We study the effectiveness of defense strategies
through non-uniformity factors.
6.7.1 Host-Based Defense
Host-based defense has been widely used for random-scanning worms. Proactive
protection and virus throttling are examples of host-based defense strategies.
A proactive protection (PP) strategy proactively hardens a system, making it
difficult for a worm to exploit vulnerabilities [7]. Techniques used by PP include
address-space randomization, pointer encryption, instruction-set randomization, and
password protection. Thus, a worm requires multiple trials to compromise a host
that implements PP. Specifically, let p (0 ≤ p ≤ 1) denote the protection probability
or the probability that a single worm attempt succeeds in infecting a vulnerable host
that implements PP. On the average, a worm should make 1
p
exploit attempts to
compromise the target. We assume that hosts with PP are uniformly deployed in the
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Internet. Let d (0 < d ≤ 1) denote the deployment ratio between the number of hosts
with PP and the total number of hosts.
To show the effectiveness of the PP strategy, we consider the infection rate of a


















(l)(1− d + dp). (98)
To slow down the spread of a sub-optimal IS worm to that of a random-scanning
worm, β(l)(1− d + dp) ≤ 1, resulting in




When PP is fully deployed, i.e., d = 1, p can be at most 1
β(l)
. On the other hand, if
PP provides perfect protection, i.e., p = 0, d should be at least 1 − 1
β(l)
. Therefore,
when β(l) is large, Inequality (99) presents high requirements for the PP strategy. For
example, if β(16) = 50 (most of β(16)’s in Table 4 are larger than this value), p ≤ 0.02
and d ≥ 0.98. That is, a PP strategy should be almost fully deployed and provide a
nearly perfect protection for a vulnerable host.
We extend the model described in [10] to characterize the spread of sub-optimal
IS worms under the defense of the PP strategy and show the results in Figure 22.
Here, Code-Red-v2-like worms spread over the C1 distribution with β(16) = 52.2. It
is observed that even when the protection probability is small (e.g., p = 0.01) and the
deployment ratio is high (e.g., d = 0.8), a /16 IS worm is slowed down a little at the
early stage, compared with a /16 IS worm without the PP defense (i.e., p = 1 and
d = 0). Moreover, when p is small (e.g., p ≤ 0.02), d is a more sensitive parameter
than p.
We next consider the virus throttling (VT) strategy that constrains the number
of outgoing connections of a host [63]. Thus, VT can reduce the scanning rate of an
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 /16 IS with p=1, d=0     
 /16 IS with p=0.01, d=0.4
 /16 IS with p=0.02, d=0.8
 /16 IS with p=0.01, d=0.8
 RS without defense         
Figure 22: A /16 IS worm spreads under the defense of PP.
infected host. We find that Equation (98) also holds for this strategy, except that p
is the ratio between the scanning rate of infected hosts with VT and that of infected
hosts without VT. Therefore, VT also requires to be almost fully deployed for fighting
network-aware worms effectively.
From these two strategies, we have learned that an effective strategy should reduce
either αRS or β
(l). Host-based defense, however, is limited in such capabilities shown
in this section.
6.7.2 IPv6
IPv6 can decrease αRS significantly [79] by increasing the scanning space. But the
non-uniformity factor would increase the infection rate if the vulnerable-host distribu-
tion is still non-uniform. Hence, an important question is whether IPv6 can counteract
network-aware worms when both αRS and β
(l) are taken into consideration.
We study this issue by computing the infection rate of a network-aware worm
in the IPv6 Internet. As pointed out by [4], a smart worm can first detect some
vulnerable hosts in /64 subnets containing many vulnerable hosts, then release to the
hosts on the hitlist, and finally spread inside these subnets. Such a worm only scans
the local /64 subnet. Thus, we focus on the spreading speed of a network-aware worm
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in a /64 subnet. From Figure 18, we extrapolate that β(32) in the IPv6 Internet can
be in the order of 105 if hosts are still distributed in a clustered fashion. Using the
parameters N = 108 proposed by [26] and s = 4, 000 used by the Slammer worm [41],




· β(32) = 2.2 × 10−3. αIPv6IS is larger than the infection rate of the Code




Therefore, IPv6 can only slow down the spread of a network-aware worm to that of
a random-scanning worm in IPv4. To defend against the worm effectively, we should
further consider how to slow down the increase rate of β(l) as l increases when IPv4
is updated to IPv6.
6.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have observed and characterized non-uniform vulnerable-host dis-
tributions across five measurement sets from different sources. We have derived a
simple metric, known as the non-uniformity factor, to quantify an uneven distribu-
tion of vulnerable hosts. The non-uniformity factors have been obtained using our
collected data, and all of which demonstrate large values. This implies that the non-
uniformity of the vulnerable-host distribution is significant and seems to be consistent
across networks and applications. Moreover, the non-uniformity factor, shown as a
function of the Renyi entropy of order two, better characterizes the uneven feature of
a distribution than the Shannon entropy.
The importance of a non-uniformity factor is that it quantifies the spreading
ability of network-aware worms. We have derived analytical expressions relating
the non-uniformity factors with the infection rates of network-aware worms. We
have empirically verified that localized scanning and modified sequential scanning
can increase the infection rate by nearly the non-uniformity factor when compared to
random scanning and thus approach the capacity of sub-optimal importance scanning.
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Furthermore, we have evaluated the effectiveness of several commonly used de-
fense strategies on network-aware worms. The host-based defense, such as proactive
protection or virus throttle, requires to be almost fully deployed to slow down worm
spreading at the early stage. This implies that host-based defense would be weakened
significantly by network-aware scanning. More surprisingly, different from previous
findings, we have shown that network-aware worms can be zero-day worms in the
IPv6 Internet if vulnerable hosts are still clustered. These findings present a sig-




SPATIAL-TEMPORAL MODELING OF WORM
PROPAGATION IN NETWORKS
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, “worms” are used to cover an entire gamut of hostile softwares in-
cluding viruses and network worms [88, 61]. There are mainly two types of worms
categorized by how they spread. Active network worms such as Slammer and Mor-
ris exploit self-propagating malicious code [40], whereas viruses such as Melissa and
Concept need human interactions to spread [28]. Spreading can take place rapidly,
resulting in potential network damages and service disruptions. Hence, an important
step towards preventing such catastrophic events is to study the dynamic behavior of
worm spreading.
The recent investigations of worm propagation mostly focus on modeling the
spread of worms employing a random scanning scheme [40, 78, 8]. Random scan-
ning selects targets to infect randomly. Worms, however, can use other scanning
methods. For example, the Morris worm exploits topological scanning that examines
local configuration files to find potential neighbors [44]. Although only a few topo-
logical worms are known, topological scanning is a potential threat to the network
routing infrastructure, World Wide Web (WWW) networks, and peer-to-peer sys-
tems [59], where topologies play an important role for worm propagation [80]. Only
a handful of works, however, have been done on topological-scanning worms. For
instance, a contact process is used to analyze the ease of propagation on different
topologies [27]. The difficulty lies in characterizing the impact of topologies and the
interactions among nodes in both space and time [32]. Such interactions result in a
complex spatial-temporal dependence, which is especially hard to model.
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The goal of this work is to develop a modeling framework and mathematical mod-
els that can characterize the spread of worms employing different scanning strategies
and the impact of the underlying topology on worm propagation. To this purpose, we
first abstract the problem of worm propagation using a graphical representation so
that different scanning methods can be mapped to the corresponding topologies and
parameters. With the help of the graphical representation, we then formulate worm
propagation through a spatial-temporal random process based on the interactions
among nodes. We take advantage of a discrete-time model and detailed topology
information to describe the spatial and temporal statistical dependencies of worm
propagation in arbitrary networks.
As the temporal dependence can be naturally modeled as Markov, the spatial
dependence requires calculations with a multivariate probability distribution. When
the number of random variables is large, an exact solution to the spatial dependence
is computationally too expensive to obtain. The problem then becomes how to ap-
proximate the spatial dependence using a simple (i.e., biased) model in a general
setting of machine learning. In particular, the spatial approximation is studied in
light of the mean-field approximation [43]. The mean-field approximation is widely
studied in machine learning [43] but usually for static networks where time is not
involved. Exact mean-field solutions for dynamic networks are complex. Hence, we
consider in this work simple approximations. The simplest approximation assumes
spatial independence, which is asserted in our independent model. The spatial in-
dependence assumption factorizes an exact joint probability distribution into a form
that only depends on one-node marginal probabilities. Although the independent
model ignores the spatial dependence, it captures the temporal dependence and the
detailed topology information. Simulation results show that the independent model
performs better than the previous models in characterizing the transient behavior of
worm propagation. A test on spatial correlation though indicates a strong spatial
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dependence among nodes. We therefore present the Markov model that incorporates
the simplest spatial dependence as the conditional independence, motivated by the
Bethe approximation used in graphical models [74]. The spatial Markov assumption
factorizes an exact joint probability distribution into a form that only depends on
one-node and two-node marginal probabilities. We have conducted both theoretical
analysis and extensive simulations on the real and synthesized topologies of large
networks. Our results demonstrate that the Markov model equipped with the sim-
ple spatial dependence can achieve a greater accuracy than the independent model,
especially in the sparse graphs. We then use a relative entropy to illustrate a per-
formance gap between the Markov model and the reality, suggesting directions for
further improvements.
We apply our proposed models to describe the final size of infection that corre-
sponds to the equilibrium solution and characterizes the potential damage of worm
propagation. Simulation results show that the Markov model can characterize the
final size of infection no matter whether the underlying network is a homogeneous
network or a complex network.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2, we provide a
problem formulation of worm propagation. In Section 7.3, we model the spread of
worms accurately through a spatial-temporal random process. To approximate the
spatial dependence, we present the independent model and the Markov model in
Sections 7.4 and 7.5, respectively. In Section 7.6, we apply our proposed models to
estimate the final size of infection. We conclude this chapter in Section 7.7 with a
brief summary.
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7.2 Worm Propagation in Networks
In this section, we first introduce worm propagation briefly. We then abstract the
problem, using a susceptible → infected → susceptible (SIS) model and a graphi-
cal representation. Finally, we model different scanning mechanisms using graphical
representations.
7.2.1 Worm Propagation
A computer is called infected if a worm is present there, and susceptible if it could
be infected by the intrusion of the worm. If a worm cannot exist on the computer,
we call this computer insusceptible to the worm. An infected computer is cured if
it removes the copy of the worm and recovers to be susceptible. The final size of
infection is defined as the number of initially susceptible computers that ultimately
become infected in a network. The widespread occurrence of a worm is referred to
as an epidemic [1]. Worm propagation is a procedure that the worm infects as many
computers as possible through network connections. Those connections can be logical
as to be described below.
A worm can propagate in many ways. For example, when a worm is released
into the Internet, it scans many machines among its neighbors in an attempt to
find a susceptible machine. When a vulnerable host is found, the worm sends out
a probe to infect the target. If successful, a copy of this worm is transferred to the
new host, which then begins to run the worm code and tries to infect other targets.
The Morris worm is a typical self-propagation worm and moves from node to node,
using only its own and the infected node’s local information [44]. Specifically, the
Morris worm retrieves the neighbor list from the local Unix files /ect/hosts.equiv
and /.rhosts and in individual users’ .forward and .rhosts files. Another topological
worm is a SSH worm, which locates new targets by searching its current host for the
names and the addresses of other hosts that are likely to be susceptible to infection
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[55]. An email virus is another example of topological worms. When an email user
receives an email message and opens the attachment containing a virus program,
the virus infects the user’s machine and uses the recipient’s address book to send
copies of itself to other email addresses. The addresses in the address book represent
the neighborhood relationship. A birth rate (or an infection rate) is introduced to
denote the rate at which an infected computer can infect a susceptible neighbor. The
birth rate is affected by many factors. For example, for worms, the factors include
the number of computer’s susceptible neighbors, the payload size of a worm copy,
the exploited computer vulnerability, and network congestion. For email viruses,
the factors include the email checking frequency, user vigilance in opening an email
attachment, and mailbox configuration. Some worms may have a large birth rate
to flood the network as quickly as possible, whereas other worms spread slowly and
surreptitiously to evade detection and thus have a small birth rate.
An infected computer might die for encountering an unexpected resource limit on
the computer. Moreover, during the spreading of a worm, some infected computers
may stop functioning properly, forcing the users to reboot these machines or kill some
of the processes exploited by the worm. These computers are then cured, but subject
to further infection. A death rate (or a cure rate) is introduced to denote the rate at
which an infected computer becomes susceptible. The death rate is affected by many
factors, such as resources on the computers, user alertness, the ability of a worm to
disguise, and the performance of intrusion detection systems (IDS).
Combining infection and recovery, we have one of the simplest epidemiological
models, the susceptible → infected → susceptible (SIS) model, which is widely used
in epidemiological research [1]. Such a model neglects the details of infection inside
a single computer, abstracts the worm transmission and removal as probabilities per
unit time in the form of the birth rate and the death rate, and considers a computer
to be in one of the two possible discrete statuses, infected or susceptible. Although
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simple, the SIS model can capture key characteristics of worm spreading dynamics.
The susceptible → infected (SI) model further ignores recovery and is regarded as a
special case of the SIS model.
The SIS model assumes that an infected computer cannot be re-infected. The
model also assumes that users do not become more vigilant after experiencing a
worm infection. Therefore, the birth rate and the death rate do not change with time.
Moreover, we ignore patching that is usually employed to repair security holes at the
computers. This is because the spreading of worms can be much faster compared
with traditional patching techniques that need human intervention, and a patch may
not be available when some worm attacks unknown vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, our
proposed models can be easily extended to take patching into consideration.
7.2.2 Graphical Representation
A worm network consists of all nodes in a network that are either infected or suscepti-
ble. The worm network can be constructed by removing insusceptible nodes and the
edges associated with these nodes in the original network. Hence, a worm network is
an abstraction of vulnerable nodes that can be either end-hosts, routers, and servers,
or email addresses.
We use a directed graph G(V,E) to represent the worm network, where V is the
set of nodes and E is the set of edges. As defined in Section 7.2.1, each node has
two statuses, susceptible or infected, as illustrated in Figure 23. Each edge (j, i) is
associated with βji, the birth rate at which an infected node j can infect a susceptible
neighbor i. Similarly, each node i is associated with δi, the death rate at which an
infected node i becomes susceptible. The neighborhood of node i, denoted by Ni, is
a subset of V such that every node j in this subset has an edge from node j to node
i, i.e., Ni = {j|(j, i) ∈ E}. Figure 23 shows an example of a directed graph wherein




























Figure 23: Directed graph (S=Susceptible, I=Infected).
We consider two widely used types of networks in the research of epidemic mod-
eling: homogeneous networks and complex networks [6]. In a homogeneous network,
each node has roughly the same nodal degree. A fully connected topology, a stan-
dard hypercubic lattice, and an Erdös-Rényi (ER) random network are three typical
examples of homogeneous networks [23]. In a complex network, the nodal degree
complies to a particular distribution. A widely studied representative complex net-
work has a power law topology, where the nodal degree distribution is characterized
as P (k) ∼ k−r with P (k) being the probability that a node has a degree of k [25].
It has been shown that the AS-level Internet topology, WWW networks, and some
overlay topologies of peer-to-peer systems can be described by power law characteris-
tics [2, 54]. Moreover, email groups and networks exhibit the power law distribution,
which is observed in [80] and [22]. Hence, worm networks with a power law topology
can be used to study potential worm propagation on those networks.
7.2.3 Scanning Methods
A worm spreads by employing distinct scanning mechanisms such as random, local-
ized, and topological scanning [59]. Although the nature of each scanning method is

































































Figure 24: Graphical representations of scanning methods.
Random scanning is used by some well-known worms such as Code Red v2 and
Sapphire worms. A worm that employs random scanning selects target IP addresses
at random. If each IP address is visualized as a network node, random scanning
results in a fully connected topology illustrated in Figure 24(a), where the birth rate
(β) is identical for every edge.
Localized scanning is used by Code Red II and Nimda worms. Instead of selecting
targets randomly, a worm preferentially scans for hosts in the “local” address space.
Such a scanning scheme results in a fully connected topology such as the one illus-
trated in Figure 24(b), where nodes within a group (e.g., IP addresses with the same
first two octets) infect one another with the same birth rate (β1), whereas nodes in
different groups infect one another with a different birth rate (β2).
Topological scanning is used by email viruses and Morris/SSH worms. The worm
relies on the information contained in the victim machine to locate new targets. The
information may include routing tables, email addresses, a list of peers, and uniform
resource locations (URLs). The topological-scanning scheme can result in an arbitrary
topology such as an undirected power law topology illustrated in Figure 24(c), where
βi’s and δi’s (i = 1, 2, · · · , 5) represent different birth rates and death rates.
Although only a few topological worms are known, topological scanning is worth
investigating for the following reasons. First, the network routing infrastructure,
WWW networks, and peer-to-peer systems are vulnerable to topological scanning.
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For example, a worm attacking a Web site could look for neighboring Web sites in its
URLs and use these Web sites as targets. Second, when IPv4 is upgraded to IPv6, the
address space will be much sparser. It would be difficult for either random-scanning
or localized-scanning worms to find a target in the IPv6 address space. Therefore,
topological scanning may be preferred by attackers. Finally, models of topological-
worm propagation would provide insights for the development of countermeasures,
which are lacking for such worms.
7.3 Spatial-temporal Model
The problem of modeling worm propagation in networks can be stated as follows:
Given a worm network topology, values of βji’s and δi’s, and an initial infection node,
what is the expected number of infected nodes at time t? To approach this problem,
we formulate worm propagation through a spatial-temporal random process based on
local interactions of nodes in networks.






1, if node i is infected at time t;
0, if node i is susceptible at time t.
As node i can be infected only by its neighbors, Xi(t) is statistically dependent on
Xi(t−1) and the statuses of its neighbors. Since the status of a neighbor also depends
on its own neighbors, conceptually, the statuses of all nodes is statistically dependent
in space and time. Let vector X(t) denote the statuses of all nodes at time t, i.e.,
X(t) = {X1(t), X2(t), · · · , XM(t)}, where M represents the total number of nodes in
the network. X(t) is then a spatial-temporal process.
If node i is susceptible, it can be compromised by any of its infected neighbors,
e.g., node j, with a birth rate βji. Therefore, given the statuses of the neighbors of
node i, at the next time step the susceptible node i can get infected with probability
βi(t) = 1 −
∏




β i (t) δ iS I 1−1−
Figure 25: State diagram of a node i.
at time t and xj(t) = 0 or 1. Otherwise, node i is infected and has a death rate δi to
recover at the next time step. This procedure can be expressed by a Markov chain
as in Figure 25. Therefore, the temporal dependence of node i can be shown as
P (Xi(t + 1) = 0|Xi(t) = 1) = δi, (100)
P (Xi(t + 1) = 1|Xi(t) = 0,XNi(t) = xNi(t)) = βi(t), (101)
where vector XNi(t) is used to denote the statuses of all neighbors of node i at time
t and vector xNi(t) is the realization of XNi(t), i.e., XNi(t) = {Xj(t), j ∈ Ni} and
xNi(t) = {xj(t), j ∈ Ni}. If for ∀j, βji << 1, the birth rate (β) is identical for every





j∈Ni xj(t) and δi = δ, which are assumptions used in the contact process [27].
The probability that node i recovers from the infected to the susceptible status at
time t + 1 is expressed by Ri(t) = P (Xi(t + 1) = 0, Xi(t) = 1). Thus, Equation (100)
leads to
Ri(t) = δiP (Xi(t) = 1). (102)
Given node i is susceptible at time t, the probability that node i remains susceptible
at the next time step can be defined as Si(t) = P (Xi(t+1) = 0|Xi(t) = 0). From the




[P (XNi(t) = xNi(t)|Xi(t) = 0)(1− βi(t))] . (103)
Therefore, the definitions of Ri(t) and Si(t) yield that for ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M},

















Figure 26: Dependency graph.
Combined with Equations (102) and (103), Equation (104) provides a recursive re-
lationship between Xi(t+1) and Xi(t), Xj(t) for j ∈ Ni, and gives a formal stochastic
model. This model explicitly characterizes the spatial and temporal statistical depen-
dencies. In particular, the joint probability P (XNi(t) = xNi(t)|Xi(t) = 0) character-
izes the spatial dependence as a result of network topologies and nodal interactions.
The transition probabilities, βi(t) and δi, characterize the temporal evolution as a
result of infection and recovery. Together, they describe the spatial-temporal process
of worm propagation in networks. The expected number of infected nodes at time




i=1 P (Xi(t) = 1).
Although in principle Equation (104) can be used to study the behavior of worm
propagation, it is challenging to model the spatial dependence. This is because the
joint probability P (XNi(t) = xNi(t)|Xi(t) = 0) is computationally too expensive to
obtain, especially when the size of the neighborhood is large. For example, if node
i has k neighbors, the total number of statuses needed to describe this joint proba-
bility is O(2k). Therefore, we introduce approximations for the spatial dependence
in Sections 7.4 and 7.5. An example of the dependency graph of the joint probabil-
ity P (XNi(t) = xNi(t)|Xi(t) = 0) is shown in Figure 26(a), where node i has three
neighbors (i.e., nodes 1, 2, 3) and all nodes are dependent on each other.
Remark: It is noted that mean-field methods are used to reduce the computational
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complexity involved in typical calculations with multivariate probability distributions
when the number of random variables is large [43]. The mean-field methods, however,
are difficult to be employed directly to our problem. A typical context for a mean-field
approximation is to compute marginal probabilities and expectations of a given joint
distribution. Our problem, however, requires to obtain an accurate joint distribution
based on the marginal probabilities. Moreover, in many cases the mean-field methods
use a set of recursions to find a stationary solution of a corresponding optimization
problem in space [65], whereas the topological worm propagation involves both space
and time. Although the mean-field methods are currently difficult to be grafted
directly to worm propagation problem, the spirit of the mean-field theory motivates
our approach for approximating the spatial dependence. For example, the naive mean
field assumes that each random variable acts independently and thus approximates
the true distribution through a complete factorization [43]. This idea is adopted by
our independent model.
7.4 Independent Model
The simplest spatial approximation is to assume independence, resulting in our inde-
pendent model.
7.4.1 Model
In the independent model, we assume that the statuses of all nodes at time t (t =
0, 1, 2, · · · ) is spatially independent. That is,
P (X(t) = x(t)) =
M∏
i=1
P (Xi(t) = xi(t)), (105)
where x(t) is the realization of X(t), i.e., x(t) = {x1(t), x2(t), · · · , xM(t)}. With the
spatial independence assumption, the dependency graph shown in Figure 26(a) is
reduced to the graph shown in Figure 26(b), which is a graph with no edges. Thus,
the joint probability P (XNi(t) = xNi(t)|Xi(t) = 0) can be factorized into a form that
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only depends on one-node marginal probabilities. This kind of the full factorization is
also employed in the naive mean-field approach, where each factor is obtained through
the mean-field equations [65].
Theorem 5 (Independent Model) If the statuses of all nodes at the same time step
is spatially independent, the state evolution of node i from Equation (104) satisfies





[1− βjiP (Xj(t) = 1)]. (107)
Proof: Since the statuses of all nodes at time t is spatially independent, it is true
that
P (XNi(t) = xNi(t)|Xi(t) = 0) =
∏
j∈Ni
P (Xj(t) = xj(t)). (108)


























[1− βjiP (Xj(t) = 1)], (112)
where the exchange of the summation and product signs is because: Set f(xj(t)) =
P (Xj(t) = xj(t))(1 − βji)xj(t) and j = 1, 2, · · · , K, where K is the number of the
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Such an independent model is intuitive. That is, node j, one of the neighbors of
node i, can infect node i with probability βjiP (Xj(t) = 1). Thus, the probability that
node i cannot be infected by its neighbors at time t+1 is
∏
j∈Ni [1− βjiP (Xj(t) = 1)],
according to the independence assumption. Although ignoring the spatial depen-
dence, the independent model maintains the temporal dependence and the detailed
topology information. Moreover, if node i has k neighbors, the total number of sta-
tuses needed to describe the joint probability P (XNi(t) = xNi(t)|Xi(t) = 0) is reduced
from O(2k) to O(k).
Remark: It should be noted that the spatial independence assumption is implicitly
used in the prior work [67]. The independent model given here, however, is different
from the model proposed in [67] in the following aspects. First, our proposed model is
derived from the accurate spatial-temporal process and the explicit approximation on
the spatial dependence. Second, our independent model only allows one event (i.e.,
susceptible → infected or infected → susceptible) in one single discrete time step,
whereas the model in [67] grants the concurrence of infection and recovery. Finally,
our model focuses on the transient behavior of worm propagation, whereas the model
in [67] emphasizes on the steady-state solution and the epidemic threshold.
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7.4.2 Performance
How accurate is this independent model? We compare the outcomes of the indepen-
dent model with those of some well-known models and the simulation results in both
homogeneous and complex networks. For simplicity, we consider the special cases
where the birth rate (β) is identical for every edge and the death rate (δ) is identical
for every node. Such assumptions are used in all previous models. Simulation results
provide a benchmark for assessing the accuracy of models. For the simulation, we
track each node’s status (infected or susceptible) in discrete time. Each simulation
has 100 individual runs and is averaged over the cases that the worm survives1.
7.4.2.1 Homogeneous Networks
In homogeneous networks, the standard Epidemiological model uses a nonlinear dif-






where k is the average nodal degree. The solution to the above equation is
n(t) =
n(0)M(1− ρ)
n(0) + [M(1− ρ)− n(0)]e−(β′−δ)t , (117)
where β′ = βk and ρ = δ
β′ . Another model used in homogeneous networks is the ana-
lytical active worm propagation (AAWP) model, which uses a discrete time equation
[8]:
n(t + 1) = (1− δ)n(t) + [M − n(t)][1− (1− 1
M
)sn(t)], (118)
where the scanning rate s = βk and the patching rate is ignored. Both the Epi-
demiological model and the AAWP model have been used to model the spread of
active worms that employ random scanning and shown to perform accurately if the
1We focus on the transient behavior of epidemic worms and ignore the cases that the worms die
out.
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Figure 27: Worm propagation in a two-dimensional lattice with 10,000 nodes, β =
0.1, and δ = 0.1.
underlying graph is an ER random graph with a large k or a fully connected topology
[32, 8].
Figure 27 shows the evolution of the average number of infected nodes for the
Epidemiological model, the AAWP model, the independent model, and the simulation
on a four-neighbor two-dimensional lattice with 10,000 nodes, β = 0.1, and δ = 0.1.
The two-dimensional lattice is wrapped around in both dimensions to form a torus.
It is observed that all three models over-predict the growth of infected nodes. The
independent model, however, describes the transient behavior of worm propagation
better than the other two models.
7.4.2.2 Complex Networks
Boguñá et al. classify complex networks into two types: uncorrelated and correlated
complex networks, and present epidemic models for each type [6]. We name these two
models as the uncorrelated complex network (UCN) model and the correlated complex
network (CCN) model. In these models, the number of infected nodes with a degree


































Figure 28: Worm propagation in a BA network with 10,000 nodes, k = 1.9998,
β = 0.5, and δ = 0.1.
where Mk is the total number of nodes with a degree of k and
∑
k Mk = M . In the


















Figure 28 compares the predictions of the independent model against the UCN
model in a Barabási-Albert (BA) network, which is a type of power law networks [2].
BA networks are generated using the AS-level BA model in the BRITE simulator
[38] that is a tool for topology generation. The BRITE simulator can provide good
synthetic topologies that are the base of our simulations. In Figure 28, the BA network
has 10,000 nodes, with k = 1.9998, β = 0.5, and δ = 0.1. The infection starts at a
single node with a degree of 5. Since the BA networks lack correlations [64], we only
consider the UCN model for BA networks. It is observed that both the independent
model and the UCN model over-predict the spread of worm. When compared with
the simulation results, however, the independent model yields a greater accuracy than
the UCN model.
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An intuitive explanation for the results in Figures 27 and 28 can be given as follows:
The Epidemiological model, the AAWP model, and the UCN model express the
propagation dynamics in terms of how many nodes are infected, without delving into
the details of which nodes are infected [32], whereas the independent model considers
the details of how nodes are connected to one another. Therefore, the topology
information can help us obtain models better than the previous ones. Moreover, the
independent model can be used in arbitrary graphs and with varying βji’s or δi’s,
whereas the other models are used in special graphs and assume that βji (or δi) is
identical for every edge (or node).
7.4.3 Test of the Spatial Independence Assumption
As the independent model achieves a better performance than the previous models,
Figures 27 and 28 still show obvious performance gaps between the independent model
and the simulation results. Is the spatial independence a good enough assumption?
To answer this question, we consider the correlation coefficient ρij(t) between the





where E[Xi(t)Xj(t)] = P (Xi(t) = 1, Xj(t) = 1), E[Xi(t)] = P (Xi(t) = 1), and
V ar[Xi(t)] = P (Xi(t) = 1)[1 − P (Xi(t) = 1)]. If the status of node i is independent
of that of node j, ρij = 0. Otherwise, if the statuses of nodes i, j are positively (or
negatively) correlated, ρij > 0 (or ρij < 0). We obtain the correlation coefficients
through simulation on a four-neighbor two-dimensional lattice with 10,000 nodes,
β = 0.1, δ = 0.1, and 1,000 individual runs. In this two-dimensional lattice, each
node is represented by its coordinate (x, y), where x, y are integers and 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 99.
Node (x, y) has four neighbors (x− 1, y), (x + 1, y), (x, y − 1), and (x, y + 1), where
arithmetic operations are modular on 100. We assume that the worm begins to spread
from node (0, 0) and consider the correlation coefficients between the statuses of node
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Figure 29: Spatial correlation in a two-dimensional lattice with 10,000 nodes, β =
0.1, and δ = 0.1.
(0, 0) and node (0, i) (denoted by ρi(t)) for i = 1, 2, 3. Figure 29 shows how the
correlation coefficients vary with time. It is observed that the correlation coefficients
are initially close to 0, but increase with time. When t > 50, all coefficients are larger
than 0.25. This shows a strong dependence in space among nodes and suggests a
better model that accounts for the spatial dependence.
7.5 Markov Model
7.5.1 Model
Our Markov model assumes a conditional independence in space [35]. That is, at
time t (t = 1, 2, 3, · · · ), given the status of node i, the statuses of its neighbors is
(conditionally) independent,
P (XNi(t) = xNi(t)|Xi(t) = xi(t)) =
∏
j∈Ni
P (Xj(t) = xj(t)|Xi(t) = xi(t)). (123)
With the spatial Markov assumption, the dependency graph shown in Figure 26(a) is
changed to the graph shown in Figure 26(c), where the edges between the neighbors
of node i are deleted. The spatial Markov assumption is motivated by the Bethe
approximation [74], a way of deriving and correcting the mean-field theory, which has
been widely investigated in the area of machine learning. The Bethe approximation
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factorizes an exact joint probability distribution into a form that only depends on
one-node and two-node marginal probabilities in a Markov network. Moreover, the
Bethe approximation is shown to be equivalent to belief propagation in [74]. Here
we adopt the spirit of the Bethe approximation by incorporating a simple spatial
dependence into the Markov model.
Theorem 6 (Markov Model) If the statuses of node i’s neighbors at the same time
step is spatially independent given the status of node i, then the state evolution of
node i from Equation (104) satisfies





[1− βjiP (Xj(t) = 1|Xi(t) = 0)]. (125)
Proof: Since the statuses of node i’s neighbors at time t is spatially independent






















[1− βjiP (Xj(t) = 1|Xi(t) = 0)] . (128)
The computation of the conditional probability P (Xj(t) = 1|Xi(t) = 0) is cal-
culated in the following way. We introduce a two-node joint probability P (Xi(t) =
1, Xj(t) = 1). Thus,
P (Xj(t) = 1|Xi(t) = 0) = P (Xj(t) = 1)− P (Xi(t) = 1, Xj(t) = 1)
P (Xi(t) = 0)
. (129)
To simply the notation, we set Puv(t) = P (Xi(t + 1) = 1, Xj(t + 1) = 1|Xi(t) =
u,Xj(t) = v), where u, v ∈ {0, 1}. The two-node joint probability can be obtained by
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the following equations:
P (Xi(t + 1) = 1, Xj(t + 1) = 1) =
∑
u,v
[P (Xi(t) = u,Xj(t) = v)Puv(t)] , (130)
where the total probability theorem is used and
P11(t) = (1− δi)(1− δj), (131)
since given that both node i and node j are infected at time t, they independently
choose to stay in the infected status;
P01(t) = (1− δj)[1− S ′i(t)], (132)
in that S ′i(t) = P (Xi(t + 1) = 0|Xi(t) = 0, Xj(t) = 1) and thus
S ′i(t) = (1− βji)
∏
l∈Ni−{j}
[1− βliP (Xl(t) = 1|Xi(t) = 0)], (133)
where the spatial Markov assumption is used; similarly,
P10(t) = (1− δi)[1− S ′j(t)], (134)
in that
S ′j(t) = (1− βij)
∏
l∈Nj−{i}
[1− βljP (Xl(t) = 1|Xj(t) = 0)]; (135)
P00(t) ≈ [1− S ′′i (t)][1− S ′′j (t)], (136)
where
S ′′i (t) =
∏
l∈Ni−{j}
[1− βliP (Xl(t) = 1|Xi(t) = 0)], (137)
S ′′j (t) =
∏
l∈Nj−{i}
[1− βljP (Xl(t) = 1|Xj(t) = 0)]. (138)
Equation (136) uses an approximation to avoid the introduction of a three-node joint
probability P (Xi(t) = 0, Xj(t) = 0, Xl(t) = xl(t)) if nodes i, j, l construct a triangle.
Equation (130) is obtained by replacing Puv(t) with the results from Equations (131)∼
(136). Equations (124) and (130) provide a recursive relationship between (Xi(t+1),
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Xj(t + 1)) and (Xi(t), Xj(t)) for j ∈ Ni. It is assumed that the statuses of all nodes
are independent at time 0.
The Markov model takes into account a part of the neglected correlations be-
tween random variables (i.e., node i and its neighbors at time t) and thus improves
the approximation. The Markov model differs from the independent model only in
the probability that one of node i’s neighbors infects node i. This probability is
βjiP (Xj(t) = 1|Xi(t) = 0) for the Markov model, whereas it is βjiP (Xj(t) = 1) for
the independent model. If the dependence between node i and its neighbors is ig-
nored, the Markov model is reduced to the independent model. Moreover, with the
spatial Markov assumption, if node i has k neighbors, the total number of statuses
needed to describe the joint probability P (XNi(t) = xNi(t)|Xi(t) = 0) is O(k).
Is it always beneficial to incorporate the spatial dependence? We investigate this
issue by introducing the notion of association defined in [24].
Definition 1 Random variables T1, · · · , Tn are associated if
Cov[f(T), g(T)] = E[f(T)g(T)]− E[f(T)]E[g(T)] ≥ 0 (139)
for all nondecreasing functions f and g for which E[f(T)], E[g(T)], and E[f(T)g(T)]
exist, and T = {T1, · · · , Tn}.
In most cases, if one neighbor of node i, e.g., node j, is infected, node i then has
an increasing probability to be infected. That is, node i and node j are positively
correlated as shown in Figure 29. Therefore, the statuses of nodes i and j, Xi(t) and
Xj(t), are associated by definition. Furthermore, if Xi(t) and XNi(t) are associated
random variables, we can show in the following theorem that the Markov model indeed
achieves a better performance than the independent model.
Theorem 7 (Performance Bound) If Xi(t) and XNi(t) are associated, then
Sindi (t) ≤ Smari (t) ≤ Si(t). (140)
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Proof: Since Xi(t) and Xj(t) (j ∈ Ni) are associated, Cov[Xi(t), Xj(t)] ≥ 0. We
can write
P (Xi(t) = 1, Xj(t) = 1) ≥ P (Xi(t) = 1) · P (Xj(t) = 1), (141)
which leads to
P (Xj(t) = 1) ≥ P (Xj(t) = 1|Xi(t) = 0). (142)
Therefore, Sindi (t) ≤ Smari (t).




Xj(t), where l ∈ Ni. Since XNi(t) are associated, from the definition of association
we have
Cov [f(XNi(t)), g(XNi(t))|Xi(t) = 0] ≥ 0, (143)
which leads to
E [f(XNi(t))|Xi(t) = 0]·E [g(XNi(t))|Xi(t) = 0] ≤ E [f(XNi(t))g(XNi(t))|Xi(t) = 0] .
(144)









(1− βji)Xj(t)|Xi(t) = 0
]
. (145)
That is, Smari ≤ Si(t).
7.5.2 Performance
How much does the spatial Markov dependence help in improving the performance?
We compare the performance of our proposed models with the simulation results in
a two-dimensional lattice, an ER random graph, a BA power law network, a real
topology, and a top-down hierarchical topology. Except for the two-dimensional lat-
tice, which is a regular graph, we begin each simulation and models with a single,
randomly chosen infected node on a given topology. Each plot considers 10 different
initially infected nodes, and each simulation plot also has 10 individual runs for an
initially infected node.
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(a) A two-dimensional lattice with 160,000 nodes
and δ = 0.1.

































(b) An ER random graph with 160,000 nodes, k =
4, and β = 0.1.

































(c) A BA network with 160,000 nodes, β = 0.1,
and δ = 0.1.
Figure 30: Worm propagation in different topologies.
Figure 30(a) compares the predictions of the independent model and the Markov
model with the simulation results on a four-neighbor two-dimensional lattice. The
number of nodes M = 160, 000, and the death rate δ = 0.1. For the case of the birth
rate β = 0.5, the three curves nearly coincide with each other. When β decreases,
however, the infection spreads at a faster rate in both the independent and the Markov
models than the simulation. In all three cases (β = 0.5, β = 0.1, β = 0.05), the
Markov model yields more accurate results than the independent model.
Figure 30(b) shows the predictions of two models with the simulation results on an
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ER random graph, with 160,000 nodes, an average nodal degree k = 4, and β = 0.1.
When we constructed the ER random graph, the generated graph was disconnected
for that k is small. Therefore, in this disconnected graph we chose the largest cluster
with 156,763 nodes and an average degree of 4.07 as the target network. It can be
seen that the Markov model yields a far better performance than the independent
model when compared with the simulation results.
Figure 30(c) depicts the simulation results against two models on a BA network,
with 160,000 nodes, β = 0.1, δ = 0.1, and < k >= k. For the case when k = 6,
both models give precise results. When k decreases, however, the predictions of both
models become worse. In all three cases (k = 6, k = 4, k = 2), the Markov model
predicts worm propagation more accurately than the independent model.
It is observed that the parameters can affect the accuracy of the models. When
β or k is large, both the independent model and the Markov model perform well.
When both β and k are small, however, both models fail to predict the slow growth
of worm propagation. Therefore, both models are suited for dense graphs, where each
node fluctuates independently about its mean value. On the other hand, the Markov
model outperforms the independent model in all cases with different parameters and
underlying topologies. That is, Theorem 7 is confirmed by the results shown in Figure
30.
Another observation is that the underlying topology can affect the speed of worm
propagation and the final size of infection. For the case of β = 0.1 and δ = 0.1,
although all three graphs (Figure 30) have the same number of nodes and edges, the
worm spreading dynamics in these graphs are significantly different. It takes the worm
about 1,716 time steps to enter an equilibrium stage in the two-dimensional lattice,
whereas it needs about 100 time steps and 66 time steps in the ER random graph
and the BA network, respectively. Moreover, after entering the equilibrium stage, the
worm infects a total of 112,506 nodes in the two-dimensional lattice, 106,023 nodes in
115
the ER random graph, and 105,511 nodes in the BA network. This shows the effect
of network structures on the dynamics of worm propagation.
Figure 31 shows worm propagation in a real topology, an ER random graph, a BA
network, and a four-neighbor two-dimensional lattice for the special case when β = 1
and δ = 0.1. The real topology is an AS graph collected at the Oregon router server
route-views.oregon-ix.net, which is a site for collecting BGP data [91]. The dataset is
selected on 1 June 2004 and contains 38,086 links among 17,653 ASes (k = 4.3). The
constructed ER random graph has a largest cluster with 17,648 nodes and k = 4.3,
and the worm only propagates in this largest cluster. The BA network has 17,652
links among 17,653 nodes (k = 2). The generated BA network is connected and thus
is a tree. The two-dimensional lattice is with 17,689 nodes and k = 4. Among all
these four topologies, the curves of both models overlap with the simulation results
in this special case. Therefore, both models can achieve the best performance in the
case of β = 1. Although the AS graph and the ER random graph have almost the
same number of (connected) nodes and the average nodal degree, the worm takes
only 6 time steps to enter an equilibrium stage in the AS graph, whereas it needs
about 9 time steps in the ER random graph. This shows that these two topologies
have different diameters and the AS graph is more vulnerable to worm propagation
than the ER random graph. It is interesting to notice that although the dynamics
of worm spreading in different topologies are distinct, the final sizes of infection are
almost the same, i.e., n(t) ≈ 16, 000, when t = 150. This reflects that for the case
when β = 1 and δ = 0.1, the final size of infection is not dependent on the network
structure, but on the total number of nodes.
Figure 32 demonstrates another special case when δ = 0, which corresponds to
the susceptible → infected (SI) model. The worm spreads in a top-down hierarchical
topology generated by BRITE [38]. The top AS-level topology is from NLANR on 2
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Figure 31: Worm propagation in a real topology, an ER random graph, a BA
network, and a two-dimensional lattice with β = 1 and δ = 0.1.

































Figure 32: Worm propagation in a top-down hierarchical topology with 129,480
nodes, 266,005 edges, and δ = 0.
January 2000 [89], with 6,474 ASes and 13,895 interconnections. The down router-
level topology is generated by the BRITE router-level BA model, with 20 nodes per
AS. The constructed top-down hierarchical topology has 129,480 nodes and 266,005
edges. The merit of the Markov model can also be observed in this special case when
δ = 0.
7.5.3 Test of the Spatial Markov Assumption
To further examine the goodness of the spatial Markov assumption, we use a relative
entropy (or Kullback-Leibler distance) between two probability mass functions p(x, t)
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The relative entropy is a measure of the distance between two distributions p(x, t)
and q(x, t). If q(x, t) is “closer” to p(x, t), D(p‖q) is smaller; and D(p‖q) = 0 if and
only if p = q.
For our case, p(x, t) = P (XNi(t) = xNi(t)|Xi(t) = 0) is the joint distribution
of the statuses of node i’s neighbors given node i is susceptible at time t. For
the independent model, q1(x, t) =
∏
j∈Ni P (Xj(t) = xj(t)); for the Markov model,
q2(x, t) =
∏
j∈Ni P (Xj(t) = xj(t)|Xi(t) = 0). We obtain the relative entropies
D(p‖q1) and D(p‖q2) through simulation on a four-neighbor two-dimensional lat-
tice with 10,000 nodes, β = 0.1, δ = 0.1, and 1,000 individual runs. As described
in Section 7.4.3, each node is represented by its coordinate, and the worm begins
to spread from node (0, 0). Node i is specified at (1, 1). Figure 33 shows how the
relative entropies D(p‖q1) and D(p‖q2) change with time. It is observed that the
relative entropies are initially close to 0, but increase with time. D(p‖q2) is smaller
than D(p‖q1) for all time t, suggesting that the spatial Markov model is indeed a
better approximation than the spatial independent model. On the other hand, when
t > 60, D(p‖q2) > 0.5. This explains the performance gap between the Markov model
and the simulation observed in Figures 30 and 32. Hence, a model that incorporates
the more spatial dependence than the Markov model may result in a smaller relative
entropy.
7.6 Final Size of Infection
The final size of infection corresponds to the equilibrium state of a worm network
that is the average number of infected nodes when time t approaches infinity, i.e.,
limt→+∞ n(t). The final size of infection characterizes the potential damage as a
result of worm propagation. If the final size of infection can be predicted at an early
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Figure 33: Relative entropies in a two-dimensional lattice with 10,000 nodes, β =
0.1, and δ = 0.1.
stage of worm spreading, the potential damage can be assessed, and preventive actions
can be taken accordingly. In this section, we compare our proposed models with the
simulation results and the other models in estimating the final size of infection in
homogeneous and complex networks. Each simulation scenario has 100 individual
runs and is averaged over the cases that worms survive. The final size of infection is
sampled at time t = 2000.
Figure 34(a) shows a comparison of the Epidemiological model, the AAWP model,
the independent model, the Markov model, and the simulation results on a connected
ER random graph with 10,000 nodes, k = 10, and δ = 0.1. When compared with the
simulation results, the Epidemiological model over-predicts the final size of infection
when β ≥ 0.02, whereas the AAWP model and the independent model slightly over-
predict it. The results of the Markov model and the simulation overlap for 0.001 ≤
β ≤ 1. Therefore, the Markov model is the most accurate one among all these models.
Figure 34(b) gives another comparison of the UCN model, the independent model,
the Markov model, and the simulation results on a BA network with 10,000 nodes,
k = 4, and β = 0.1. The UCN model over-predicts the final size of infection, whereas






































(a) An ER random graph with 10,000 nodes, k =




































(b) A BA network with 10,000 nodes, k = 4, and
β = 0.1.
Figure 34: Performance comparisons in estimating the final size of infection.
the simulation overlap for 0.001 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Therefore, both the independent model
and the Markov model are shown to be good estimators of the final size of infection,
and the Markov model is more accurate than the independent model.
7.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented a spatial-temporal model to study the dynamic
spreading of worms that employ different scanning methods. Making use of this
model, we have studied the impact of the underlying topology on worm propagation.
We show that the detailed topology information and the spatial dependence are key
factors in modeling the spread of worms. The independent model incorporates the de-
tailed topology information and thus outperforms the previous models. Our Markov
model incorporates both the detailed topology information and the simple spatial
dependence, and thus achieves a greater accuracy than the independent model, espe-
cially when both the birth rate and the average nodal degree are small. Moreover,
when the graph is dense, each node fluctuates independently about its mean value,
and thus both models perform well. These results are validated through analysis and
extensive simulations on large networks using real and synthesized topologies.
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The class of models we have investigated are biased, i.e., with a reduced complex-
ity. Hence, the accuracy of such models is important. The relative entropy is used
as a performance measure and shows that a performance gap still exists between the
Markov model and the reality. Formulations are needed to incorporate the more spa-
tial dependence into the model. Furthermore, as both models are motivated by the
spirit of the mean-field approximation in machine learning, a formal treatment of the
mean-field approximation to include the temporal dependence will be studied in our
future work. As part of the ongoing work, we also plan to estimate the parameters
of worm propagation (e.g., the birth rate and the death rate) and use our proposed
models to study the countermeasures for controlling the spread of worms. Our mod-
eling approach may also help to understand a wide range of information propagation




CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS
8.1 Research Contributions
In this thesis, the research on characterizing worm attack behaviors, analyzing In-
ternet vulnerabilities, and developing effective countermeasures has been conducted.
Research contributions have been made in the following areas:
1. Designing an optimal worm-scanning method.
2. Analyzing two sub-optimal worm-scanning methods.
3. Evaluating the vulnerability of the Internet.
4. Modeling the spread of topological-scanning worms.
8.1.1 Designing an Optimal Worm-Scanning Method
Most Internet worms use random scanning. The distribution of vulnerable hosts on
the Internet, however, is highly non-uniform over the IP-address space. This implies
that random scanning wastes many scans on invulnerable addresses and more viru-
lent scanning schemes may take advantage of the non-uniformity of a vulnerable-host
distribution. Questions then arise as to how attackers may exploit such information
and how virulent the resulting worm may be. These issues provide “worst-case sce-
narios” for defenders and “best-case scenarios” for attackers when the vulnerable-host
distribution is available.
In Chapter 3, a new worm-scanning method, called importance scanning, is de-
signed. Important scanning results from importance sampling in statistics and scans
the IP-address space according to an empirical distribution of vulnerable hosts. An
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analytical model is developed to relate the infection rate of worms with the importance-
scanning strategies. Based on parameters chosen from Witty and Code Red worms,
the experimental results show that an importance-scanning worm can spread much
faster than either a random-scanning worm or a routing worm. In addition, a game-
theoretical approach suggests that the best strategy for defenders is to scatter appli-
cations uniformly in the entire IP-address space.
8.1.2 Analyzing Two Sub-Optimal Worm-Scanning Methods
The use of side information by an attacker can help a worm speed up the propagation.
This philosophy has been the basis for advanced worm-scanning mechanisms such as
hitlist scanning, routable scanning, and importance scanning. Some of these scanning
methods use information on vulnerable hosts. Such information, however, may not
be easy to collect before a worm is released. Questions then arise whether and how a
worm can self-learn or exploit such information while propagating; and how virulent
the resulting worms may be. As an optimal scanning strategy is difficult to implement,
two practical sub-optimal scanning methods are investigated.
In Chapter 4, a self-learning worm using the static importance scanning and the
botnet structure is designed and studied. The self-learning worm is demonstrated
analytically and empirically to have the ability to accurately estimate the under-
lying vulnerable-host distribution in /8 subnets when only 500 infected hosts are
observed. Experimental results based on parameters chosen from Code Red v2 and
Witty worms show that a self-learning worm can spread much faster than a random-
scanning worm, a permutation-scanning worm, and a Class-A routing worm. Further-
more, some guidelines for detecting and defending against such self-learning worms
are also discussed.
In Chapter 5, localized scanning, a simple yet effective technique used by attackers
to search for vulnerable hosts, is studied. Localized scanning trades off between the
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local and the global search of vulnerable hosts and has been used by Code Red II and
Nimda worms. First, the relationships between vulnerable-host distributions and the
spread of localized-scanning worms are characterized through mathematical modeling
and analysis. Then, an optimal localized-scanning strategy that provides an upper
bound on the spreading speed of localized-scanning self-propagating codes is designed.
Furthermore, three variants of localized scanning are constructed. Specifically, the
feedback localized scanning and the ping-pong localized scanning adapt the scanning
methods based on the feedback from the probed host, and thus spread faster than
the original localized scanning and meanwhile have a smaller variance.
8.1.3 Evaluating the Vulnerability of the Internet
In Chapter 6, three aspects are investigated jointly: (a) a network vulnerability as
the non-uniform vulnerable-host distribution, (b) threats, i.e., intelligent worms that
exploit such a vulnerability, and (c) defense, i.e., challenges for fighting the threats.
First, five data sets are studied, and consistent clustered vulnerable-host distribu-
tions are observed. Then, a new metric, referred to as the non-uniformity factor, is
presented. The non-uniformity factor quantifies the unevenness of a vulnerable-host
distribution. This metric is essentially the Renyi information entropy and better char-
acterizes the non-uniformity of a distribution than the Shannon entropy. Next, the
infection rate and the propagation speed of network-aware worms are measured ana-
lytically and empirically. A representative network-aware worm is shown to increase
the spreading speed by exactly or nearly a non-uniformity factor when compared
to a random-scanning worm at the early stage of worm propagation. This implies
that when a worm exploits an uneven vulnerable-host distribution as a network-wide
vulnerability, the Internet can be infected much more rapidly. Furthermore, the ef-
fectiveness of defense strategies on the spread of network-aware worms is analyzed.
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Experimental results demonstrate that counteracting network-aware worms is a sig-
nificant challenge for the strategies that include host-based defense and IPv6.
8.1.4 Modeling the Spread of Topological-Scanning Worms
Topology information is a fundamental element that enables topological-scanning
worms, such as the Morris worm. The spread of topological-scanning worms, how-
ever, is especially hard to model. The difficulty lies in characterizing the impact of
topologies and the interactions among nodes in both space and time.
In Chapter 7, the spread of topological worms is modeled. Our model is moti-
vated by probabilistic graphs, which have been widely investigated in machine learn-
ing. First, a graphical representation is used to abstract the propagation of worms
that employ different scanning methods. Then, a spatial-temporal random process
is presented to describe the statistical dependence of worm propagation in arbitrary
topologies. As the spatial dependence is particularly difficult to characterize, the
problem becomes how to use simple (i.e., biased) models to approximate the spatially
dependent process. In particular, the independent model and the Markov model are
proposed as simple approximations. Both theoretical analysis and extensive simula-
tions on large networks using both real measurements and synthesized topologies are
conducted to test the performance of the proposed models. Our results show that the
independent model can capture the temporal dependence and the detailed topology
information and thus outperforms the previous models, whereas the Markov model
incorporates a certain spatial dependence and thus achieves a greater accuracy in
characterizing both the transient and equilibrium behaviors of worm propagation.
8.2 Future Research Directions
• Worm Defense System Design and Analysis: An effective yet practical
worm defense system is important and urgent. Since some areas of the Internet
are responsible for a disproportionate number of vulnerable hosts, the problem is
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how to adequately secure these areas. A collaboration system among firewalls
will be developed, exploiting the vulnerable-host distribution. The following
important questions will be answered: How can firewalls cooperate with each
other to block worm traffic effectively? How do firewalls treat traffic differently
based on where the traffic is generated? How can the system defeat the malicious
firewall(s)?
• Worm Tomography: Internet security and resilience require methods to de-
tect and estimate worm behaviors. Most worms use random scanning to re-
cruit new bots, which can be observed by Darknet that is defined as a globally
routable address space in which no active services or servers reside. The term,
worm tomography, is used to describe the process of inferring the characteris-
tics of worms from Darknet observations. The primary difficulty in using this
approach lies in the growth trend of background noise [51].
• Malicious Sources Analysis: It is important that defenders identify Internet
areas that are responsible for a significant portion of attacks. We have obtained
402-day traces from DShield [84]. We attempt to discover how the malicious
sources distribute across the Internet and how they change with time.
• Game Theory Between Attackers and Defenders: The evolution of the
Internet has created a real arms race between attackers and defenders. Defend-
ers attempt to understand the skills that attackers use and develop systems
against them. On the other hand, attackers endeavor to learn the weakness of
the systems that defenders build and design new methods to overcome or evade
these systems. Both attackers and defenders can eventually learn about the op-
ponent’s strategies and design the optimal tactics. Therefore, this interaction
naturally leads to a game theory framework between attackers and defenders.
A simple game theory approach has been applied to the optimal worm-scanning
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attack and defense described in this thesis. The more complex interaction in
the game, however, should be considered in the future research.
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